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Abstract	  	  The	  present	  paper	   treats	   the	   issue	  of	   economic	   foundations,	   on	  which	  political	   power	  rests,	  and	  the	  specific	  problem	  of	  public	  debt	  in	  the	  developed	  countries.	  Starting	  from	  the	  general	  question:	  “Why	  do	  rich	  governments	  borrow	  so	  much?”	  the	  paper	  develops	  a	  model	  of	  political	  power	  based	  on	  the	  possession	  of	  capital,	  and	  on	  the	  transformation	  of	  public	   possession	   into	   private	   property	   rights.	   Empirical	   investigation	   follows,	   in	   a	  sample	   of	   21	   countries,	   demonstrating	   that	   there	   is	   an	  objectively	   existing	   transfer	   of	  capital	   from	   public	   borrowing	   to	   private	   property	   rights;	   that	   transfer	   is	   connected	  mostly	   to	   the	  property	  of	  non-­‐productive	   assets,	   and	  goes	  beyond	   the	   easily	   inferable	  relation	   to	   net	   exports.	   That	   the	   transfer	   from	   public	   borrowing	   to	   private	   property	  rights	   is	   strongly	   correlated	  with	   the	   relative	  dispersion	  or	   concentration	  of	  power	   in	  the	  political	  system.	  We	  are	  witnessing	  a	  progressive	  withdrawal	  of	  public	  finance	  and	  public	   borrowing	   as	   a	   means	   of	   transferring	   capital,	   with	   a	   simultaneously	   growing	  idiosyncrasy	  (cross-­‐sectinal	  variance)	  of	  fiscality.	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Introduction	  	  Politicians	  use	  to	  do	  things	  that	  economists	  qualify	  as	  stupid.	  That	  is	  a	  plain	  social	  fact.	  Saying	   that	  a	  given	  public	  policy,	   regarding	  economic	  matters,	   is	   “politically	  driven”	   is	  almost	   an	   insult.	   Yet,	   treating	   the	   political	   side	   of	   public	   governance	   as	   simply	  “irrational”	   is	   irrational	   in	   itself.	   Politics	   are	   a	   set	   of	   patterns	   of	   behaviour,	   and	   said	  patterns	  have	  emerged	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  some	  social	  changes.	  From	  the	  economic	  point	  of	  view,	  fiscal	  policy	  is	  maybe	  the	  most	  controversial	  field	  of	  public	  governance.	  	  According	  to	  the	  “Fiscal	  Monitor”,	  issued	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  October	  2013,	   reducing	   public	   indebtedness	   is	   one	   of	   the	   major	   challenges	   that	   the	   global	  economy	   is	   currently	   facing.	   Restrictive	   fiscal	   policies	   that	   lead	   to	   that	   purpose	   are	  socially	  painful,	  sometimes	  pro-­‐cyclical,	  and	  politically	  risky	  (if	  not	  suicidal).	  Most	  of	  the	  current	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  short-­‐term,	  cyclical	  outcomes	  of	  fiscal	  restrictions.	  Yet,	  another	   issue	   is	   even	   more	   important:	   how	   durable	   and	   sustainable	   are	   the	   fiscal	  outcomes	  of	   these	  policies?	   If	  we	   succeed	   in	   reducing	  public	   indebtedness	  by	   five	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	   today,	  what	   is	   the	   likelihood	  of	   that	  being	  a	  durable	  gain?	  Will	   the	  public	  sector	   stay	  mean	  and	   lean	   for	  decades	  or	  will	   it	   behave	   according	   to	   a	  post-­‐diet-­‐yoyo	  pattern?	  The	  theory	  of	  economics,	  at	  least	  the	  contemporary	  one,	  seems	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  the	  confrontation	  of	   two	  standpoints.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	  economic	  mainstream	  with	   the	   assumption	   that	   public	   debt	   is	   a	   burden	   to	   the	   economy.	   (e.g.	  Meade	   19581;	  Modigliani	   19612;	   Diamond	   19653).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	   vota	   separata	   to	   that	  mainstream	   opinion	   has	   been	   expressed,	   for	   example,	   by	   the	   early	   post-­‐keynesians:	  Abba	  Lerner	  (Lerner	  19434)	  and	  Alvin	  H.Hansen	  (Hansen	  19455).	  Later	  developments,	  based	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   „Ricardian	   equivalence”,	   and	   brought	   forth	   mostly	   by	   Robert	  Barro	   (Sraffa	   19516;	   Barro	   19747,	   19798,	   19869,	   198710,	   1989a11,	   1989b12),	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Meade, J.,E., 1958, Is the National Debt a Burden, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 126 - 150 
2 Modigliani, F., 1961, Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies And the Burden of the National Debt, Economic 
Journal, no. 71, pp. 730 - 755 
3 Diamond, P., E., 1965, National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, The American Economic Review, volume 55, issue 5 
(Dec., 1965), pp. 1126 - 1150 
4 Lerner, A., 1943, Functional Finance and The Federal Debt, Social Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (FEBRUARY 1943), pp. 38-51 
5 Hansen, A., H., 1945, Three Methods of Expansion through Fiscal Policy, The American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 
(Jun., 1945), pp. 382-387 
6 Sraffa, P., 1951, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume IV, Pamphlets and Papers, 1815 – 1823, „Funding 
System”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
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noticeable	  contribution	  from	  the	  part	  of	  James	  Buchanan	  (Buchanan	  197613;	  Buchanan,	  Wagner	  1977)14.	  	  Against	  the	  background	  of	  those	  opposed	  views	  upon	  the	  burdensomness	  of	  public	  debt,	  a	   third	   scholarly	   stream	   is	   to	  notice,	  which	  points	   at	   the	  mutual	   relationship	  between	  public	  debt,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  across	  the	  private	  sector.	  A	  first	  glance	  at	  that	  aspect	   of	   the	  matter	   comes	   from	  Adam	  Smith	   in	   person,	  who	   argued	   that	   public	   debt	  emerges	  and	  gains	  in	  importance	  when,	  and	  only	  when	  the	  private	  sector	  accumulates	  a	  certain	  critical	  amount	  of	  capital.	  Beyond	  that	  critical	  amount,	  there	  is	  more	  capital	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  typical	  business	  ventures,	  and	  lending	  to	  the	  government,	  with	  low	  risk	  and	  constant	   interest	  rate	  becomes	  a	  substantial	  source	  of	  capitalistic	  revenues.	   In	  the	  same	   time,	   the	   necessity	   of	   changing	   the	   policy	   of	   taxation,	   in	   order	   to	   pay	   back	   the	  public	  debt,	  creates	  a	  spiral-­‐like	  connection	  between	  debt	  and	  taxes.	  Consequently,	  the	  whole	  social	  structure	  changes	  as	  public	  debt	  grows15.	  Interestingly	  enough,	  that	  path	  of	  thinking	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  been	  largely	  neglected	  by	  the	  posteriority,	  with	  the	  „burden	  or	  no	  burden”	  dilemma	  taking	  the	  lead.	  It	  is	  to	  note	  that	  Franco	  Modigliani,	  cited	  above,	  with	  his	  very	  original	  approach,	  seems	  to	  have	  returned	  to	  that	  intuition	  of	  connection	  between	   public	   debt,	   and	   private	   assets.	   Yet,	   Gregory	   Mankiw	   seems	   to	   have	   really	  blown	   the	  dust	   off	   that	   Smithsonian	   approach.	   Starting	   from	  earlier	   research	  of	   other	  scholars	  (Hall	  197816;	  Shea	  199517;	  Parker	  199918;	  Souleles	  199919;	  Kotlikoff,	  Summers	  198120;	  Wolff	  199821),	  Mankiw	  traced	  a	  relatively	  simple	  model,	  in	  which	  he	  attempted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Barro, R.J., 1974, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Political Economy, no. 82, November/December 1974, pp. 
1095 - 1117 
8 Barro, R.J., 1979, On The Determination of the Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy, no. 87, October 1979, pp. 940 - 
971 
9 Barro, R.J., 1986, U.S. Deficits Since World War I, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 88 no.1, pp. 195 - 222 
10 Barro, R.J., 1987, Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices and Budget Deficits in the United Kingdom, 1701 – 1918, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, September 1987, no. 20, pp. 221 - 247 
11 Barro, R.J., 1989, The Neoclassical Approach to Fiscal Policy, w: Barro, R.J. (ed.), 1989, Modern Business Cycle Theory, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press 
12 Barro, R.,J., The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1989, 
pp. 37 - 54 
13 Buchanan, J., 1976, Barro on The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, Journal of Political Economy, no. 84, April 1976, pp. 337 
- 342 
14 It is to note that some scholars question the well-founded of attributing the concept of „Ricardian equivalence” to David 
Ricardo’s work. See for example: O’Driscoll, G.P., 1977, The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem, Journal of Political 
Economy, no. 85, February 1977, pp. 207 – 210 
15 That Adam Smith’s theory is expressed in the third chapter („On public debts”) of the fifth book in his treaty.  
16 Hall, R.,E., 1978, Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle – Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence, Journal 
of Political Economy, December 1978, 86(6), pp. 971– 87 
17 Shea, J., 1995, Union Contracts and the Life - Cycle/Permanent - Income Hypothesis, American Economic Review, March 
1995, no. 85(1), pp. 186 –200. 
18 Parker, J., 1999, The Response of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes, American 
Economic Review, September 1999, no.89(4), pp.959 –973 
19 Souleles, N., S., The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds,  American Economic Review, September 
1999, no. 89(4), pp. 947–958 
20 Kotlikoff, L., J., Summers, L. H., 1981, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, Journal 
of Political Economy, August 1981, no. 89(4), pp. 706–732 
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to	  prove	  that	  the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt	  is	  closely	  matched,	  and	  functionally	  linked	  to	   the	   accumulation	   of	   private	   property	   rights	   in	   the	   wealthiest	   layers	   of	   society	  (Mankiw	  200022).	  	  The	  main	  line	  of	  confrontation	  in	  the	  economic	  doctrine,	  as	  for	  public	  debt,	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  burden	  for	  the	  economy	  or	  not.	  At	  best,	  with	  the	  Robert	  Barro’s	  view,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	   debt	   is	   economically	   neutral.	   Keeping	   all	   that	   in	  mind,	   let’s	   have	   a	   look	   at	   some	  stylized	  facts	  about	  public	  debt.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2011,	  only	  fourteen	  countries,	  among	  the	  188	  reported,	  did	  not	  have	  any	  gross	  public	  debt,	   i.e.	   their	  public	  sectors	  did	  not	  have	  any	  financial	   liabilities	  (IMF	  201223).	  The	  total	  value	  of	  the	  global,	  gross	  public	  debt	  at	  the	   end	   of	   2011	  was	   of	   55	   trillions	   of	   USD,	  which	   corresponded	   to	   some	   79%	   of	   the	  global	   GDP.	   Six	   countries	   owed	   over	   80%	   of	   that	   total,	   namely:	   Japan,	   United	   States,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  France,	  and	  United	  Kingdom.	  The	  richest	  borrow	  the	  most,	  so	  to	  say.	  The	  question	  is:	  what	  for?	  Why?	  Are	  they	  all	  so	  irresponsible?	  Another,	   interesting	  stylized	  fact	  comes	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  net	  public	  debt.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  2011,	  89	  countries	  out	  if	  the	  188	  reported	  by	  the	  IMF	  did	  not	  have	  any	  explicit	  net	  debt.	   The	   most	   interesting	   are	   those	   countries,	   whose	   governments	   are	   indebted	   in	  gross	   terms,	   yet	   have	   public	   reserves	   of	   finacial	   assets	  way	   above	   their	   gross	   debt	   or	  close	  to:	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Kazachstan,	  Norway,	  Sweden,	  Finland,	  Denmark,	  Jamaica,	  Erytrea,	  and	  Cote	  d’Ivoire.	  Those,	  who	  clearly	  have	  plenty	  of	  cash,	  borrow	  still	  more.	  Once	  again,	  the	  question	  returns:	  what	  for	  and	  why?	  One	  of	   the	  goals	  of	   the	  present	  paper	   is	   to	  develop	  a	  synthesis	  of	   the	  purely	  economic	  approach	   to	  public	  debt	  with	   the	  political	  one.	  The	   chief	   thought	  of	   that	  path	   is	   taken	  from	  Max	  Weber	  (194724;	  197825),	  namely	  that	  a	   full	  explanation	  of	  social	  phenomena	  requires	  not	  only	  to	  draw	  a	  normative	  model	  of	  rational	  behaviour	  recommended	  in	  the	  given	  case,	  but	  also	   to	  explain	   the	  motives	   that	  push	  social	   actors	   to	  depart	   from	   that	  model.	  The	  theory	  of	  politics	  is	  traditionally	  attached	  to	  two	  concepts,	  both	  taken	  from	  the	   Weber-­‐Parsons	   tradition,	   namely:	   action	   and	   system	   (besides	   the	   already	   cited	  works	   of	   Max	   Weber,	   the	   following	   seems	   relevant:	   Parsons,	   Shills	   195126;	   Parsons	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Wolff, E. N., 1998, Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Household Wealth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 
1998, no. 12(3), pp. 131–150 
22 Mankiw, N. G., 2000, The Savers–Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy, American Economic Review, no. 90(2), pp. 120–125. 
23 World Economic Outlook April 2013, the database, available at www.imf.org  
24 Weber Max, 1947, The Theory of Social And Economic Organisation, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 
New York, Oxford University Press 
25 Weber, M.,1978, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology, University of California Press. 
26 Parsons, T., Shills, E.A., 1951 [ed], Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Pressm 1951 
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1937-­‐194927).	   Action	   is	   marked	   by	   purpose	   (or	   motive,	   according	   to	   the	   strict	   Max	  Weber’s	   terms).	   Actions	   form	   a	   system,	   when	   we	   can	   observe	   a	   phenomenon	   of	  advanced	  self-­‐explanation	  in	  a	  set	  of	  actions;	  any	  action	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  its	  relation	  to	  other	  actions	  of	  the	  set,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  frontier,	  beyond	  which	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  go	   for	   explanation	   (although,	   of	   course,	  we	   could).	  Nicklas	  Luhmann	  used	   the	   term	  of	  “operational	   closure”	   to	   describe	   that	   capacity	   of	   a	   system	   to	   be	   self-­‐explanatory	  (Luhmann	  199228).	  Hence,	   in	  order	   to	  explain	   the	  accumulation	  of	  huge	  public	  debt	   in	  otherwise	  rich	  and	  stable	  democracies,	  we	  are	  about	  to	  define	  a	  self	  –	  explanatory	  set	  of	  actions	   that	   can	   form	   an	   operationally	   closed	   system.	   Action	   and	   purpose	   make	  strategies.	   This	   brings	   us	   back	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   games	   and	   allows	   the	   bridging	   from	  political	  sciences	  to	  economics.	  We	  can	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  such	  an	  operationally	  closed	  system	  of	   political	   strategies,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  Nicklas	   Luhman’s	   systems	   theory,	  which	  allows	   the	   accumulation	   of	   public	   debt	   as	   a	   rational	   means	   to	   accumulate	   political	  power.	   That	   assumption	   is	   confronted	  with	   a	   substantial	   body	   of	   research	   in	   political	  sciences,	   which	   proves	   quite	   convincingly	   that	   some	   characteristics	   of	   the	   political	  system	  are	  crucial	  for	  the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt.	  The	  trait	  that	  seems	  particularly	  important	  is	  the	  relative	  dispersion	  of	  political	  power,	  for	  example	  among	  various	  veto	  players.	   The	   greater	   that	   relative	   dispersion	   of	   political	   powers	   within	   the	   national,	  political	  system,	  the	  greater	  the	  propensity	  of	  the	  government	  to	  accumulate	  public	  debt	  (see	  for	  example:	  Tsebelis	  200229;	  Perroti,	  Kondopoulos	  200030;	  Roubini,	  Sachs	  198931;	  von	  Hagen,	  Harden	  199532;	  Hallerberg,	  199933).	  We	  face	  a	  paradox	  at	  the	  junction	  of	  economics	  and	  politics.	  Having	  accumulated	  more	  public	  debt	  than	  predecessors	  did	  is	  a	  typical	  ground	  for	  criticism	  in	  politics.	  It	  can	  even	  become	   a	   pretty	   reliable	  way	   to	   lose	   political	   power	   in	   the	   next	   elections.	  Why,	   then,	  have	   the	   politicians	   in	   charge,	   in	   the	   richest	   countries	   of	   the	   globe,	   been	   doing	  something	  so	  suicidal?	  One	  possible	  answer	   is:	   to	  promote	  social	  outcomes,	   that	   taxes	  didn’t	   suffice	   to	   finance.	   This	   is	   the	   “distress”	   logic	   of	   public	   borrowing:	   governments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Parsons, T., 1937, The Structure of Social Action, McGraw-Hill, 1949 by The Free Press 
28 Lumann, N., 1992, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of The Legal System, Cardozo Law 
Review, Vol. 13, pp. 1419 - 1441 
29 Tsebelis, G., 2002, Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton University Press. 
30 Perotti, R., Kontopoulos, Y., 2000, Fragmented Fiscal Policy, Mimeo, Columbia University 
31 Roubini, N., Sachs, J., 1989, Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, Economic Policy, 8, 
pp. 700-32 
32 Von Hagen, J., Harden, I.J., 1995, Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline, European Economic Review, 39 
(April): 771-79 
33 Hallerberg, M., von Hagen, J., 1999, Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European 
Union, in: Poterba, James, von Hagen, J., Eds. Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press: 209 - 232. 
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borrow	  because	  they	  have	  to,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  wealth	  for	  their	  citizens.	  It	  is	  not	  quite	  clear	  why	  any	  substitution	  of	  private	  capital	   to	   the	  public	  one	  couldn’t	  do	   the	   job,	  but	  let’s	   assume	   that	   this	   is	   a	   possible	   explanation.	   The	   second	   possible	   answer	   is:	  governments	   borrow	   because	   they	   can,	   and	   the	   richer	   the	  whole	   society	   is,	   the	  more	  they	  can	  borrow,	  and	  they	  use	  this	  opportunity.	  At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  economic	  literature	  devoted	  to	   the	   topic	   of	   public	   debt	   tacitly	   assumes	   that	   in	   the	   action	   of	   public	   borrowing,	   the	  government	   is	   the	  active	  part,	  whilst	   the	  capital	  markets	  are	  rather	  passively	  reacting.	  After	   all,	   sovereign	   debt	   is	   a	   low	   risk	   asset…	   Conversely	   to	   that	   commonly	   assumed	  attribution	   of	   roles,	   the	   present	   paper	   returns	   to	   the	   old	   thesis	   of	   Adam	   Smith,	   that	  public	   debt	   emerges	   and	   accumulates	   because	   of	   the	   development	   of	   capital	  markets.	  Adam	   Smith	   stated	   that	   public	   borrowing	   emerged	   when	   the	   private	   sector	   had	  accumulated	   a	   surplus	   of	   capital,	   temporarily	   not	   used	   in	   financing	   business	   strictly	  spoken.	   The	   owners	   of	   that	   surplus	   looked	   for	   employing	   those	   assets	   in	   a	   profitable	  way,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  created	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  governments	  (monarchs	  in	  Adam	  Smith’s	  times)	  to	  become	  more	  and	  more	  prodigal,	  and	  to	  borrow	  more	  and	  more	  from	  private	  creditors.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	   in	  the	  Smithsonian	  approach	  we	  think	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  balance	  sheet	  and	  assume	  that	  borrowing	  is	  always	  the	  broke	  cousin	  of	  lending.	  Does	  it	  matter	  at	  all?	  Let’s	  illustrate	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  example	  of	  consumer	  loans.	  If	  monetary	  statistics	  show	  that	  households	  have	  been	  increasingly	  borrowing,	   the	  most	   immediate	  explanation	  of	  any	  economist	  is	  that	  it	  is	  because	  banks	  are	  lending	  more,	  thus	  the	  supply	  of	  money	  is	  greater.	  Further,	  in	  that	  path,	  we	  could	  conclude	  that	  maybe	  the	  interest	  rates	  should	  go	  up.	   No	   serious	   economist	   would	   assume	   that	   the	   dominant	   cause	   of	   the	   growing	  borrowing	  from	  the	  part	  of	  households	  is	  their	  deteriorating	  material	  status.	  No	  serious	  economist	   would	   assume	   that	   households	   borrow	   more	   because	   they	   are	   in	   such	   a	  financial	   distress.	   They	   borrow	   more	   because	   banks	   lend	   them	   more	   –	   that’s	   the	  canonical	   (and	   rational)	   approach.	   Yet,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   public	   debt,	   for	   some	   reason,	  reason	  does	  not	  work	  any	  more.	  When	  governments	  borrow	  more,	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  they	  do	  so	  because	  they	  have	  their	  back	  against	  the	  wall.	  There	  is	  not	  really	  a	  crowd	  of	   economists	   claiming	   that	   governments	   borrow	   more	   because	   creditors	   lend	   them	  more,	  and	  that	  the	  capital	  market	  is	  the	  spiritus	  movens	  of	  public	  borrowing.	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There	  is	  a	  deeper	  logic	  behind	  that	  Smithsonian	  thesis	  that	  public	  borrowing	  is	  mostly	  driven	   by	   the	   supply	   of	   capital	   from	   the	   private	   sector.	   Instead	   of	   seeing	   public	   debt	  outstanding	  as	  the	  cumulative	  outcome	  of	  more	  or	  less	  random	  flows	  of	  borrowing,	  we	  see	  it	  as	  a	  balance	  sheet.	  Public	  debt	  has	  to	  have	  a	  mirroring	  set	  of	  assets	  financed	  with	  that	  debt.	  What	  are	  these	  assets?	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  durable,	  capital	  goods	  are	  created	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  public	  borrowing?	  Are	  they	  property	  rights?	  Are	  they	  public	  goods?	  	  All	   those	   theoretical	  questions	  have	  practical	   implications.	  From	   the	  practical	  point	  of	  view,	   the	  distinction	   is	   between	   fiscal	   policies	   that	   effectively	  work	   and	   those	   that	   do	  not.	   If	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   accumulation	   of	   public	   debt	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   financial	  distress	  of	  governments	  in	  carrying	  out	  their	  public	  mission,	  the	  logical	  way	  of	  slowing	  down	  their	  run	  toward	  the	  fiscal	  cliff	   is	  to	  cut	  on	  the	  public	  mission,	   in	  other	  words	  to	  drive	   the	   whole	   society	   into	   the	   conservative	   paradise.	   Yet,	   the	   obvious	   drawback	   of	  such	   policies	   is	   that	   politically	   they	   are	   seldom	   enforceable,	   unless	   the	   government	  wants	  to	  have	  a	  popular	  upheaval	  to	  handle	  (e.g.	  the	  case	  of	  Greece	  or	  Spain).	  Besides,	  social	   cuts	   usually	   bring	   about	   the	   loss	   of	   jobs,	   which	   deteriorates	   the	   tax	   base,	   and	  further	  contributes	  to	  worsen	  the	  fiscal	  balance.	  If,	  conversely,	  we	  assume	  that	  public	  borrowing	  is	  mostly	  driven	  by	  the	  capital	  market,	  i.e.	  by	  a	  pressure	  to	  transfer	  capital	  from	  one	  place	  in	  that	  market	  to	  another	  place,	  with	  the	   help	   of	   specific,	   low-­‐risk	   contracts	   connected	   to	   public	   borrowing,	   the	   recipe	  changes.	  Find	  a	  substitute	  way	  of	  transferring	  capital	  with	  minimum	  risk,	  or	  increase	  the	  risk	  connected	  to	  public	  borrowing,	  and	  public	  borrowing	  might	  become	  useless,	  or	  at	  least	  much	   less	   attractive.	   The	  present	   paper	   goes	  definitely	   in	   this	   direction.	   It	   takes	  anew	   the	   old	   Smithsonian	   hypothesis	   of	   public	   debt	   being	   pushed	   by	   the	   capital	  markets.	   To	   that,	   the	   author	   adds	   a	   development	   on	   the	   previously	   cited	   research	   of	  Franco	  Modigliani.	  Modigliani	  very	  convincingly	   showed	   that	   there	   is	  a	   clear,	   financial	  transfer	  from	  public	  debt	  to	  private	  wealth.	  More	  exactly,	  it	  is	  the	  transfer	  from	  the	  net	  public	   debt	   to	   the	   differential	   between	   savings	   and	   investment,	   or	   S	   –	   I.	   The	   present	  paper	  takes	  that	  Franco	  Modigliani’s	  thesis	  in	  a	  broader	  sense,	  places	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Smithsonian	  thesis,	  and	  follows	  the	   impact	  of	   fiscal	  decisions	  upon	  he	  accumulatio	  and	  allocation	  of	  property	  rights.	  The	  reason	  of	  referring	  to	  property	  rights	  is	  twofold.	  Firstly,	  staying	  into	  Franco	  Modigliani’s	  spirit,	  it	  is	  just	  as	  much	  about	  balances	  as	  about	  flows.	  Both	  savings,	  and	  investment	  are	  flows	  that	  alter	  the	  balance	  of	  assets.	  Secondly,	  turning	   to	   the	  Smithsonian	  approach,	  we	  assume	   that	  public	  debt	   accumulates	  mostly	  
	   9	  
because	  private	  providers	  of	  capital	  want	  to	   lend.	  Yet,	  “wanting”	   is	   imprecise	  from	  the	  point	   of	   view	   of	   a	   social	   scientist.	   Assessing	   what	   people	   want	   is	   essentially	  psychological	  in	  its	  method,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  aggregate	  the	  “wanting”	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  social	  system.	  Yet,	  social	  sciences	  have	  a	  set	  of	  concepts	  appropriate	  for	  that	  purpose,	  namely	  the	  theory	  of	  games,	  and	   its	  pivotal	  concept	  of	  strategy.	  Strategies,	   in	  turn,	   are	   not	   oriented	   on	   assets	   as	   such,	   but	   on	   the	   rights	   to	   those	   assets.	   It	   is	   not	  indifferent	  whether	  I	  rent	  a	  house,	  or	  own	  it.	  In	  both	  cases,	  I	  possess	  the	  asset,	  but	  only	  in	   the	   latter	   case,	   I	   have	   full	   benefits	   out	   of	   that	   possession.	   This	   is	   the	   reason	   for	  referring	  to	  property	  rights.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  a	  theoretical	  model	   is	   introduced.	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  create	  a	   logical	  path	   starting	   at	   the	   questions	   and	   doubts	   mentioned	   above,	   leading	   through	  econometric	   research	   and	   further	   to	   developing	   conclusions	   about	   public	   governance.	  The	  model	   is	   followed,	   in	   another	   chapter,	   by	   the	   presentation	   of	   empirical	   research	  connected	  to	  the	  topic.	  	  	  
The	  theoretical	  model	  	  
“Economists	  should	  cease	  proffering	  policy	  advice	  as	  if	  they	  were	  employed	  by	  a	  benevolent	  
despot,	  and	  they	  should	  look	  to	  the	  structure	  within	  which	  political	  decisions	  are	  made.”	  	  
James	  Buchanan	  (198734)	  	  In	   the	   present	   model,	   the	   logic	   adopted	   is	   that	   of	   advancing	   gradually	   from	   weak	  assumptions	   to	   stronger	   ones.	   The	  weak	   assumptions	   are	   those,	  which	   give	   the	   basic	  logical	   frame	  to	  empirical	  research	  and	  allow	  the	  selection	  of	  data	  and	  methodological	  tools	  for	  such	  research.	  As	  we	  add	  stronger	  and	  stronger	  assumptions	  to	  the	  model,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  results	  of	  empirical	  research	  conducted	  by	  the	  author,	  and	  that	  of	  other	  researchers.	  In	  other	  words,	  strengthening	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  model	  serves	  to	  anchor	  the	  findings	  of	  empirical	  research	  in	  the	  acquis	  of	  social	  sciences.	  	  We	  can	  safely,	  and	  weakly	  assume	  that	  the	  way	  society	  works	  may	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  social	   game	   with	   imperfect	   information,	   in	   the	   sense	   presented	   by	   John	   Harsanyi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Buchanan, J.,M,. 1987, The Constitution of Economic Policy, The American Economic Review, vol. 77, Issue 3 (June, 1987),  
pp. 243 – 250 
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(Harsanyi	  195335;	  196636;	  196737;	  196838).	  We	  can	  also	  weakly	  assume	  that	  strategies	  played	  by	  social	  actors	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  characterized	  by	  the	  expected	  outcomes,	  the	  actual	   outcomes,	   and	   the	   modalities	   of	   action	   used.	   We	   distinguish	   three	   subsets	   of	  social	  actors,	  namely	   those	  striving	   to	  acquire	  private	  property	  rights,	   those	  aiming	  at	  developing	  political	  power,	  and	  those	  oriented	  on	  creating	  public	  goods	  understood	  as	  positive	   social	   outcomes,	   e.g.	   reduction	   of	   the	   infatile	  mortality.	   Let’s	   designate	   those	  sets,	   respectively,	   as	  M	  =	   {i1,	   i2,	   i3,	  …,	   im}	   as	   for	   action	   oriented	   on	   acquiring	   property	  rights,	  N	  =	  {j1,	  j2,	  j3,	  …,	  jn}	   as	   for	  action	  oriented	  on	   the	  development	  of	  political	  power,	  and	   O	   =	   {k1,	   k2,	   k3,	   …,	   kz}.	   Note	   that	   these	   subsets	   are	   usually	   overlapping	   (see,	   for	  example,	   the	   U.S.	   political	   system),	   and	   they	   are	   complex	   structures	   themselves.	  Corporations	   and	   financial	   trusts	   aim	   at	   acquiring	   property	   rights,	   as	   well	   as	   their	  executives	   do	   as	   private	   persons.	   In	   the	   same	   manner,	   politicians	   operate	   within	  political	  parties,	   coalitions	  etc.,	   and	  each	  of	   these	   structures	   takes	   steps	   to	  develop	   its	  political	  power.	  	  Thus,	  among	  all	  the	  strategies	  practiced	  by	  social	  actors,	  within	  the	  given	  social	  system,	  one	   can	   distinguish	   three	   subsets,	   namely	   strategies	   oriented	   on	   the	   acquisition	   of	  property	  rights,	  or	  S(PR),	  those	  oriented	  on	  the	  development	  of	  political	  power,	  or	  S(PP),	  and	  those	  aiming	  the	  creation	  of	  public	  goods	  or	  S(PG).	  All	  are	  mixed	  strategies,	  made	  of	  pure	  ones,	  in	  the	  sense	  proposed	  by	  John	  Nash	  (Nash	  1950a39;	  1950b40;	  195141;	  195342).	  	  Pure	  strategies	  are	  defined	  as	  pairs	  made	  of	  a	  particular	  goal	  combined	  with	  a	  particular	  modality	  of	  action.	  Fiscal	   decisions,	   namely	   taxation,	   public	   borrowing	   and	   public	   spending,	   are	   pure	  modalities	   of	   action	   that	   some	   social	   actors,	   especially	   those,	  who	   already	   have	   some	  political	  power,	  use	  to	  achieve	  various	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  taxation	  may	  be	  used	  to	  increase	  political	   support,	   to	  promote	  some	  particular	  property	   rights,	  or	   create	   some	  particular	   public	   goods.	   We	   also	   assume	   that	   aggregate	   savings	   of	   the	   society	   are	   a	  quantitative	   measure	   of	   incremental	   change	   in	   the	   value	   of	   the	   total	   set	   of	   private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Harsanyi, J.C., 1953, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk – Taking – The Journal of Political 
Economy, 1953, vol. 61, issue 5, pp. 434 - 435 
36 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1966, A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations – Econometrica, 1966, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 
613 - 634 
37 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1967, Games With Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part I: The Basic Model  – 
Management Science, 1967, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 159 - 182 
38 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1968, Games With Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium 
Points – Management Science, 1968, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 320 - 334 
39 Nash, J.F., 1950, Equilibrium Points in n – Person Games – Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, vol. 36, no.1, pp. 48 - 49 
40 Nash, J.F., 1950, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, vol. 18, no.2, pp. 155 - 162 
41 Nash, J.F., 1951, Non – Cooperative Games, The Annals of Mathematics, Second Series, vol. 54, issue 2, pp. 286 - 295 
42 Nash, J.F., 1953, Two – Person Cooperative Games – Econometrica, vol. 21, issue 1, pp. 128 - 140 
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property	   rights.	   Similarly,	   aggregate	   investment	   is	   a	   quantitative	  measure	   of	   the	  way	  this	   incremental	   change	   of	   property	   rights	   is	   further	   allocated	   between	   productive	  assets,	   and	   the	   non-­‐productive	   ones.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   creation	   of	   public	   goods	   is	  possible	  to	  estimate	  as	  incremental	  change	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  social	  indicators,	  as	  used,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  On	   the	  grounds	  of	   those	  weak	  assumptions,	  we	  state	  a	  general	   hypothesis	   that	   there	  
exists	  such	  a	  set	  of	  political	  strategies,	  whose	  players’	  modalities	  of	  action	  consist	  in	  fiscal	  
decisions	   and	   which	   bring	   significant	   changes	   in	   aggregate	   saving,	   and	   aggregate	  
investment,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  public	  goods.	  	  Now,	   we	   start	   adding	   stronger	   assumptions.	   The	   capacity	   to	   bring,	   through	   fiscal	  decisions,	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  set	  of	  property	  rights	  means	  economic	  power.	  	  Any	  hierarchical,	  social	  structure	  –	  states	  and	  corporations	  included	  -­‐	  is	  able	  to	  sustain	  itself	   over	   long	   periods	   of	   time	   if	   it	   has	   both	   legitimation,	   and	   economic	   power.	  Legitimation	   is	  defined	  qualitatively,	  and	  quantitatively.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   it	   is	  a	   set	  of	  basic	  rights,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  actions	  to	  which	  the	  government	  is	  entitled.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   qualitative	   scope	   of	   legitimation	   can	   be	   translated	   into	   some	   kind	   of	   quantitative	  index.	  Legitimation	  is	  grounded	  both	  in	  past	  communicative,	  political	  action	  (Habermas	  197543,	   197944,	   199645),	   and	   the	   actual,	   normative	   quality	   of	   the	   social	   order	   in	   place	  (Rawls	   199946).	   Economic	   power	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   actual	   control	   over	   flows	   and	  balances	  of	  capital,	  both	  financial	  and	  physical.	  Of	  course,	  defining	  political	  power	  with	  reference	  to	  economic	  power	  is	  also	  very	  much	  related	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Karl	  Marx.	  In	  that	  Marxist,	  social	  mechanism	  of	  capital	  transfer,	  the	  powers	  of	  public	  agents	  have	  the	  social	  role	   of	   quasi-­‐property	   rights.	   The	   constructive	   possession	   of	   capital	   by	   public	   agents	  relies	  on	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  probably	  the	  strongest	  possible	   case	   of	   constructive	   possession.	   Besides	   the	   powers	   expressly	  written	   in	   the	  law,	   there	   is	   a	  whole	   set	   of	   discretional	   powers.	   The	   latter	   emerge	  whenever	   the	   law	  allows	  decisional	  freedom	  to	  public	  agents,	  either	  on	  purpose,	  or	  by	  unwanted	  collision	  of	   legal	   rules.	   Those	   discretional	   powers	   are	   directly	   proportional	   to	   the	   amount	   of	  capital	  that	  public	  agents	  have	  possession	  of	  within	  their	  discretional	  freedom.	  Thus,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Habermas, J., 1975, Legitimation Crisis, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston, 1975 
44 Habermas, J., 1979, Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston 1979 
45 Habermas, J., 1996, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, translated by William Rehg, Second Printing  
46 Rawls, J., 1999, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
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is	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  discretional	  public	  powers	  across	  the	  social	  system	  significantly	  influences	  the	  set	  of	  property	  rights.	  	  For	  any	  social	  agent,	  governments	  included,	  legitimacy	  and	  economic	  power	  can	  remain	  in	   three	   possible	   relations	   to	   each	   other.	   The	   hypothetical,	   perfect	   state	   of	   nature	   is	  equilibrium,	  in	  which	  economic	  power	  is	  just	  what	  the	  social	  agent	  needs	  to	  fulfil	  their	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  prerogatives,	  and,	  correspondingly,	   the	  actual	   legitimation	   is	   just	  what	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   exploit	   the	   economic	   power	   at	   hand.	   With	   a	   hint	   of	  simplification,	  real	  political	  power	   is	   to	   find	   in	  that	  equilibrium	  zone,	  or	  at	   least	   in	  the	  zone	  of	  legitimation	  and	  economic	  power	  overlapping	  each	  other.	  Legitimation	  changes	  slowly,	   at	   the	   pace	   of	   legal	   change,	   which	   can	   take	   hundreds	   of	   years	   in	   some	   cases,	  decades	  at	  best.	  Conversely,	  economic	  power	  changes	  quickly,	  sometimes	  within	  weeks.	  Governments	   can	   acquire	   or	   lose	   economic	   power	   significantly	   faster	   than	   they	   can	  change	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  legitimacy,	  as	  the	  former	  is	  very	  much	  in	  the	  swift	  hands	  of	  the	  executive	  power,	  whilst	   the	   latter	  depends	  mostly	  on	   the	  much	  steadier	  actions	  of	   the	  legislative	   and	   judiciary	  branches.	   If	  we	  attempt	   to	   see	  political	   power	   in	  quantitative	  terms,	   we	   can	   speak	   of	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   it,	   possible	   to	   achieve	   through	   various	  combinations	   of	   legitimation,	   and	   economic	   power.	   Thus,	   some	   kind	   of	   indifference	  curve	  may	  be	  traced,	  showing	  various	  possible	  structures	  of	  a	  given	  amount	  of	  political	  power,	  regarding	  its	  footing	  in	  legitimation,	  and	  in	  the	  control	  of	  capital.	  The	   public	   sector	   of	   any	   given	   country	   is	   an	   organization,	   or,	   if	   we	   take	   local	  governments	   into	  account,	  a	  semi-­‐hierarchical	  network	  of	  organizations.	   In	   that	  sense,	  the	  state	   is	  not	  a	  monolith,	  but	  a	  structured	  political	  community.	  What	  we	  can	  call	   the	  behaviour	   of	   the	   state	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   individual	   strategies,	   through	  which	  every	  singe	  subject	  belonging	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  maximizes	  their	  discretionary,	  political	   power	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   a	   given	   combination	   of	   legitimation,	   and	   economic	  power.	   A	   game-­‐theoretic	   approach	   can	   be	   used	   to	   model	   the	   transformation	   of	  individual	  strategies	  into	  collective	  political	  action.	  The	  present	  paper	  mostly	  taps	  from	  the	   John	   Harsanyi’s	   theory	   of	   games	   with	   imperfect	   information	   (Harsanyi	   195347;	  196648;	   196749;	   196850).	   The	   public	   sector	   is	   financed	   by	   a	   flow	   of	   capital	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Harsanyi, J.C., 1953Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk – Taking – The Journal of Political 
Economy, 1953, vol. 61, issue 5, pp. 434 - 435 
48 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1966, A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations – Econometrica, 1966, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 
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private	   sector	   in	   the	   form	   of	   taxes	   and	   public	   borrowing,	   and	   redistributes	   that	   flow.	  Each	  public	  agent	  maximizes	  the	  utility	  derived	  from	  the	  temporary	  possession	  of	  that	  capital,	  just	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  agency	  theory	  assumes	  it	  as	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  (Berle,	  Means	  193251;	  Wilson	  196852;	  Berhold	  197153;	  197354;	  Jensen,	  Meckling	  197655;	  Fama,	  Jensen	  198356).	  As	  formalised	  in	  the	  equation	  (1),	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  t	  there	  is	  a	  stream	  of	  public	  expenses	  PEt,	   financed	  by	  taxes	  Tt	  and	  public	  debt	  PDt	  accumulated	  at	  the	  moment	   t	   (i.e.	   the	   “fresh”	   public	   borrowing).	   The	   temporary	   possession	   of	   capital	  absorbed	  under	   the	   form	  of	  public	  debt	   leads	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	   temporary	  political	  profits	  PLt	   in	   the	  public	   sector,	   as	  well	   as	   temporary	   financial	  profits	  Ft	   in	   the	  private	  sector.	  These	  current,	  temporary	  profits	  modify	  the	  set	  PRt-­‐1	  of	  property	  rights,	  in	  place	  before	   their	   emergence.	   New	   property	   rights	   emerge,	   namely	   PRt,	   and	   it	   influences	  further	  transfers	  of	  capital,	  i.e.	  further	  public	  borrowing	  PDt+1,	  and	  further	  taxation	  Tt+1.	  	  	  	  	  	   𝑃𝐸! = 𝑃𝐷! + 𝑇! → (𝑃𝐿! ;𝐹! ) → 𝑃𝑅!!! → 𝑃𝑅! → 𝑃𝐸!!! = 𝑃𝐷!!! + 𝑇!!!   (1) 	  In	   that	  Marxist,	  social	  mechanism	  of	  capital	   transfer,	   the	  powers	  of	  public	  agents	  have	  the	  social	  role	  of	  quasi-­‐property	  rights.	  The	  constructive	  possession	  of	  capital	  by	  public	  agents	  relies	  on	  the	  general	  principle	  of	   the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	  state.	   It	   is	  probably	  the	  strongest	  possible	  case	  of	  constructive	  possession.	  Besides	  the	  powers	  expressly	  written	  in	  the	  law,	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  discretional	  powers.	  The	  latter	  emerge	  whenever	  the	  law	   allows	   decisional	   freedom	   to	   public	   agents,	   either	   on	   purpose,	   or	   by	   unwanted	  collision	   of	   legal	   rules.	   Those	   discretional	   powers	   are	   directly	   proportional	   to	   the	  amount	   of	   capital	   that	   public	   agents	   have	   possession	   of	   within	   their	   discretional	  freedom.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  discretional	  public	  powers	  across	  the	  social	  system	  significantly	  influences	  the	  set	  of	  property	  rights.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Harsanyi,  J.C., 1968, Games With Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium 
Points – Management Science, 1968, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 320 - 334 
51 Berle, A., A., Means, G.,C., 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co, 1932 
52 Wilson, R., 1968, On the Theory of Syndicates, Econometrica, vol. 36 (January), pp. 119-132 
53 Berhold, M., 1971, A Theory of Linear Profit Sharing Incentives, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXXXV (August), pp. 
460-482 
54 Ross, S., A., 1973, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problems, American Economic Review, vol. LXII (May), 
pp. 134-139 
55 Jensen, M.,C., Meckling, W.,H., 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, ( October ), vo. 3, no. 4, pp. 305 - 360 
56 Fama, E.,F., Jensen, M.,C., 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, June 
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At	  any	  given	  moment	  t,	  the	  current	  set	  of	  property	  rights	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  social	  game,	  played	  by	  k	  players57,	  who	  participate	   in	  public	  borrowing	  and	  in	   its	  redistribution.	  At	  the	   moment	   t,	   each	   player	   j	   plays	   an	   individual	   strategy	   St(j),	   defined	   by	   both	   the	  expected,	  and	  the	  actual	  property	  rights.	  Equation	  (2)	  formalizes	  these	  strategies.	  At	  the	  moment	  t-­‐1	  each	  player	  formulates	  expectations	  as	  for:	  a)	  the	  future,	  individual,	  political	  (pl*t-­‐1)	   and	   financial	   (f*t-­‐1)	   profits	   coming	   from	   the	   expected	   property	   rights	   b)	   the	  acquisition	  price	  of	  future	  assets	  (c*t-­‐1),	  and	  c)	  the	  future,	  expected	  transaction	  costs	  tr*t-­‐
1	  connected	  to	  these	  assets.	  Those	  expectations	  lead	  to	  actions,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  lead	  to	  the	  formation	   of	   an	   actual	   set	   of	   property	   rights	   owned	   by	   the	   player	   j	   at	   the	  moment	   t,	  characterized	   by	   analogous	   variables,	   namely:	   political	   profits	   plt,	   financial	   profits	   ft,	  acquisition	  price	  ct,	  and	  transaction	  costs	  trt.	  The	  relationship	  of	  these	  actual	  profits	  and	  costs	  to	  the	  expected	  ones	  defines	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  player’s	  strategy.	  Players	  seek	  consistent	   strategies,	   i.e.	   they	  maximize	   consistency	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   expected	   gains	  coming	   as	   secondary.	   In	   the	   next	   step,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   passage	   from	   the	   moment	   t	   to	   the	  moment	   t+1,	  players	   formulate	   their	  strategies	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	  past	  consistency,	   i.e.	  on	   the	   grounds	   of	   the	   	   !! !!"!!!!!!"!!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ !!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ 	  ratio.	   As	   experience	   accumulates,	   at	   the	  moment	   t+1	   each	   player	   acquires	   a	   modified	   set	   of	   property	   rights,	   and	   again,	   the	  strategic	   consistency	   is	   evaluated	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   the	   	  !!!1!!"!!1!!!!1!!"!!1!!∗!!"!∗!!!∗!!"!∗ 	  	   ratio.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  formulating	  further	  expectations	  etc.	  	  	  	  	  	   𝑆! 𝑗 = !! !!"!!!!!!"!!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ !!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ → !!!1!!"!!1!!!!1!!"!!1!!∗!!"!∗!!!∗!!"!∗ 	   (2)	  	  Each	  individual	  strategy	  St(j)	   is	  defined	  by	  a	  function	  of	  consistency	  CSt(j),	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  equation	  (2a).	  	  	   𝐶𝑆! 𝑗 = !! !!"!!!!!!"!!!!!1!!"!!1!!!!1!!"!!1!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ !!!!!∗ !!"!!!∗ !!!∗!!"!∗!!!∗!!"!∗ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2a)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The concept of player herein is quite broad. For example, a politician may be a minister, and a private owner in parallel. 
As a minister, he takes actions that influence private property rights, and as a private owner, he develops a strategy too. 
Besides, players do not have to be individuals; they can be organisations. Hence, there can be players inside players, so to 
say.  
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Fiscal	   policy	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   aggregate	   consistency	   of	   strategies	   played	   by	   all	   the	  public	   agents	   taken	   together	   display,	   possible	   to	   represent	   mathematically	   as	   the	  integral	   of	   individual	   consistencies,	   or	   𝐶𝑆! 𝑗!!!! .	   The	   combination	   of	   taxes	   T	   and	  public	  borrowing	  PD	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  respective,	  aggregate	  consistencies	  from	  the	  public	   agents’	   standpoint,	   namely	   of	   𝐶𝑆! 𝑗;𝑃𝐷!!!! ,	   and	   𝐶𝑆! 𝑗;𝑇!!!! .	   This	   is	  formalized	  in	  the	  equation	  (2b).	  	   !"! !;!"!!!! !"! !;!!!!! → !"!!!                (2b) 	  	  The	   respective	   consistencies	   of	   taxation,	   and	   public	   borrowing	   tend	   to	   display	  significant	   disparity.	   The	   outcome	   of	   taxation	   is	   highly	   uncertain.	   As	   legal	   rules	   of	  taxation	  are	  voted,	  public	  agents	  formulate	  expectations	  as	  for	  the	  future	  tax	  base	  and	  its	  average	   rate	   of	   taxation.	   It	   sums	   up,	   by	   and	   large,	   to	   predicting	   the	   taxpayers’	   future	  economic	   and	   legal	   patterns	   of	   behaviour,	   which,	   in	   turn,	   are	   the	   outcome	   of	   fiscal	  policy.	   A	   vicious	   circle	   appears,	   and	   the	   more	   radical	   are	   the	   current	   changes	   in	   tax	  regulations,	   the	   more	   vicious	   it	   becomes.	   Conversely,	   public	   borrowing	   is	   a	   highly	  predictable	  set	  of	  contracts,	  whose	  conditions	  are	  greatly	  standardized	  by	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  capital	  market.	  As	  public	  agents	  maximize	  consistency	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  their	  
strategies	  will	  be	  naturally	  oriented	  on	  maximizing	  public	  borrowing	  within	   the	  
available	  limits,	  and	  on	  considering	  taxation	  only	  as	  the	  necessary	  tool	  to	  finance	  
the	  resulting,	  residual	  value	  of	  public	  expenses,	  impossible	  to	  cover	  with	  debt.	  	  	  Property	   rights	   encompass	   three	   types	   of	   assets:	   productive	   (ex.	   machinery),	   real	  unproductive	   (ex.	   land),	  and	   financial	   (ex.	   securities).	  For	  productive	  assets	  are	  highly	  specific	  and	  not	  really	  liquid,	  they	  display	  the	  highest	  transaction	  costs.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  highly	   liquid	  and	  unspecific	   financial	  assets	  generate	   the	   lowest	   transaction	  costs,	   real	  unproductive	   assets	   coming	   in	   the	   middle	   between	   the	   two.	   Individual	   strategies	  focused	   on	   the	   acquisition	   of	   property	   rights	   to	   productive	   assets	   give	   an	   aggregate	  outcome	  measured	  by	  the	  aggregate	  investment	  “I”.	  Conversely,	  individual	  acquisitions	  of	  the	  real	  unproductive	  and	  financial	  assets	  sum	  up	  to	  the	  aggregate	  surplus	  of	  savings	  over	   investment,	   or	   “S	   –	   I”.	   Equation	   (3)	   formalizes	   this	   assumption,	   with	   z	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corresponding	  to	  a	  hypothetical	  past	  moment	  when	  the	  accumulation	  of	  the	  present	  set	  of	  property	  rights	  started.	  	  𝑃𝑅! = 𝐼!!!! + 𝑆 − 𝐼!!!!!!!!   (3) The	   strategies	   of	   public	   agents	   influence	   the	   formation	   of	   property	   rights	   in	   three	  manners.	   As	   public	   agents,	   at	   the	   bottom	   line,	   are	   also	   private	   ones	   (all	   public	  functionaries	   are	   citizens,	   too)	   they	   use	   the	   financial	   profits	   derived	   from	   the	  redistribution	  of	  public	   funds	   to	  acquire	  property	  rights.	  Secondly,	   the	  enforcement	  of	  discretional	  powers	  held	  by	  the	  public	  agents	  frequently	  leads	  to	  important	  investment	  decisions	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Public	  procurement	  is	  maybe	  the	  best	  example.	  Thirdly,	  public	   debt	   consists	  mostly	   of	   securities,	   which	   are	   the	   object	   of	   property	   rights	   too.	  They	  are	  financial	  assets	  with	  low	  transaction	  cost,	  relatively	  low	  yield,	  but	  a	  very	  low	  risk.	  The	  more	  sovereign	  bonds	  is	  there	  in	  circulation,	  the	  lower	  is	  the	  reference	  level,	  in	  individual	   strategies	   of	   property	   rights,	   as	   for	   consistency,	   and	   expected	   financial	  profits.	   A	   substantial	   presence	   of	   public	   debt	   in	   the	   capital	   market	   tends	   to	   bias	  individual	  strategies	  of	  property	  rights	  towards	  high	  aversion	  to	  risk,	  high	  liquidity,	  low	  transaction	   costs,	   and	   low	   expected	   profits.	   Such	   strategic	   preferences	   mean	   more	  money	  spent	  on	  financial	  assets,	  and	  on	  the	  real	  unproductive	  ones,	  at	  the	  detriment	  of	  productive	   assets.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   means	  more	   S	   –	   I,	   and	   less	   I.	   In	   the	   same	   time,	  significant	   public	   borrowing	   gives	   to	   public	   agents	   more	   discretional	   power,	   and	  increases	  their	  appetite	  for	  risk,	  as	  there	  is	  more	  to	  gain	  in	  terms	  of	  said	  power.	  Thus,	  substantial	   public	   debt	   favours	   relatively	   conservative	   strategies	   from	   the	   part	   of	  private	  agents	  as	  for	  their	  property	  rights,	  and	  relatively	  risky	  strategies	  from	  the	  part	  of	  public	  agents,	  as	  for	  the	  enlargement	  of	  their	  discretional	  power.	  	  The	   consistency	   of	   public	   agents’	   strategies,	   as	   for	   discretional	   power	   grounded	   in	  public	   borrowing,	   modifies	   the	   strategies	   of	   private	   agents	   as	   for	   property	   rights.	  Equation	   (4)	   gives	   a	   synthetic	   expression	   of	   a	   social	   system,	   in	  which	   fiscal	   decisions	  shape	  private	  allocation	  regarding	  the	  type	  of	  assets	  acquired,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  brings	  an	  aggregate	  result	  at	  the	  level	  of	  investment	  I,	  and	  the	  private	  surplus	  S	  –	  I.	  The	  resulting	  set	  of	  property	  rights	  further	  shapes	  fiscal	  decision	  etc.	  	  	   𝐶𝑆! 𝑗;𝑃𝐷!!!! 𝐶𝑆! 𝑗;𝑇!!!! → 𝐼 + 𝑆 − 𝐼!!!!!!!! ! → 𝐼 + 𝑆 − 𝐼!!!!!!!! !!1 → 𝐶𝑆!!1 𝑗;𝑃𝐷
!!!! 𝐶𝑆!!1 𝑗;𝑇!!!! 	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  (4)	  	  Equations	   (1)	   –	   (4)	   allow	   formulating	   another,	  more	   specific	   hypothesis,	   namely	   that	  
individual	   strategies	   of	   public	   agents,	   aiming	   at	  maximizing	   discretional	   power	  
that	   results	   from	   the	   possession	   of	   capital	   absorbed	   in	   the	   form	   of	   public	   debt,	  
modify	  the	  strategies	  used	  by	  private	  agents	  regarding	  the	  acquisition	  of	  property	  
rights.	  	  	  The	  obvious	  question	  at	  this	  point	  is	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  that	  pattern	  of	  social	  change.	  Up	  to	  what	  point	  public	  debt	  may	  be	  accumulated?	  The	  model	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  there	  is	   convergence	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   public,	   and	   the	   private	   agents,	   as	   everybody	  gains	  something	  through	  the	  redistribution	  of	  public	  debt.	  Let’s	  study	  more	  in	  detail	  that	  issue,	  with	   a	   general	   focus	   on	   the	   possible	   conflicts	   of	   interests.	   There	   are	   two	   cases	  when	  such	  a	  conflict	  is	  likely	  to	  appear:	  public	  default	  in	  payment,	  and	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policy.	  Payment	  default	  may	   take	   several	   shapes,	   ranging	   from	   the	   soft	   rolling-­‐over	  of	  the	   debt	   (conversion	   of	   one	   set	   of	   bonds	   into	   another,	   so	   as,	   at	   the	   bottom	   line,	   the	  creditor	  is	  paid	  back	  with	  bonds,	  not	  with	  money)	  up	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  public	  bankruptcy.	  Whatever	   is	   the	  exact	   case	  of	  default,	   it	   sums	  up	   to	  a	   specific	   strategy	  of	   the	   indebted	  government,	   consisting	   in	   discriminating	   its	   liabilities	   into	   categories	   regarding	   their	  priority	  of	  payment.	   It	   is	   to	  note	   that	  what	   is	   commonly	   called	  public	  bankruptcy	   is	   a	  bankruptcy	   de	   iure,	   not	   de	   facto	   (Eaton,	   Gersovitz	   198158).	   The	   government	   does	   not	  lose	  liquidity;	  it	  simply	  leads	  the	  aforementioned	  discrimination	  of	  liabilities	  to	  a	  point,	  in	   which	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   liquidity	   in	   internal	   redistribution	   of	   capital	   it	   suspends	  completely	  the	  payment	  of	  other	  liabilities.	  Whatever	  the	  exact	  shape	  of	  public	  default,	  it	  sums	  up	   to	   a	   group	  of	  private	   creditors	  being	  outnumbered	  by	   all	   the	  other	   creditors	  and	   stakeholders.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   whilst	   the	   soft	   rolling-­‐over	   of	   public	   debt	  frequently	  encounters	  vigorous	  opposition	  of	  at	  least	  some	  creditors,	  public	  bankruptcy	  usually	   results	   in	   the	  creation	  of	  exceptional	   financial	  packages	  of	   further	   loans	   to	   the	  government	   in	   default.	   Most	   creditors	   put	   strategic	   consistency	   at	   the	   head	   of	   their	  priorities	  and	  above	  all	  take	  care	  of	  not	  destabilizing	  the	  situation.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Eaton, J., Gersovitz, M., 1981, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, The Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 48, No.2, (Apr. 1981), pp. 289 - 309 
	   18	  
Regarding	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policy,	  one	  assumption	  is	  to	  make	  right	  from	  the	  start:	  they	  are	  not	  initiated	  because	  of	  moral	  judgments	  in	  the	  lines	  of:	  “it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  mean	  than	  profuse”.	   International	  political	  pressure	   is	   the	  key	  motive	   force.	  That	  pressure	   is,	   in	  a	  sense,	   an	   anticipated	   prevention	   of	   the	   possible	   default,	   i.e.	   of	   discrimination	   among	  liabilities.	  Some	  creditors	   take	  care	  of	   forcing	   the	  government	   to	  reduce	   the	  stream	  of	  benefits	  to	  all	  the	  stakeholders	  more	  or	  less	  equally.	  Once	  again,	  we	  have	  one	  group	  of	  creditors	  that	  enters	  into	  a	  conflict	  of	  interests	  with	  all	  the	  other	  stakeholders.	  Yet,	  this	  time,	  that	  precise	  group	  outnumbers	  the	  others.	  	  The	  type	  of	   individual	  strategies	  as	  for	  property	  rights	  marks	  the	  frontier	  between	  the	  conflicted	   groups	   of	   interest.	   Some	   private	   agents	   prioritize	   the	   consistence	   of	  investment	   in	   sovereign	  bonds.	  When	   they	  perceive	   that	   consistency	  as	   threatened	  by	  the	   government’s	   excessive	   indebtedness,	   they	   start	   preventive	   action.	   Should	   they	  succeed,	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policy	  is	  implemented.	  If	  they	  fail,	  public	  borrowing	  continues	  unaltered,	  with	  the	  eventual	  default	  in	  view.	  Whilst	  governments	  tend	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  most	  reliable	  debtors,	  they	  also	  have	  the	  strongest	  position	  in	  the	  possible	  conflict	  with	  their	  creditors.	  There	  is	  a	  strong,	  legal	  asymmetry	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereign	  immunity.	  States	  are	  sovereign,	  and	  equal	  to	   other	   states.	   Ordinary	   tribunals	   cannot	   pronounce	   any	   binding	   verdict	   as	   for	   the	  enforcement	  of	   claims	   resulting	   from	  public	  debt.	  Governments	  may	  deliberately	   limit	  their	   sovereignty	   through	   contracts,	   but	   they	   cannot	   be	   forced	   to	   do	   that	   (see	   for	  example:	  Brownlie	  200359).	  During	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  and	  for	  the	  best	  of	  the	  20th	   century,	   the	   principle	   of	   sovereignty	   had	   been	   an	   absolute	   barrier	   to	   the	  enforcement	  of	  any	  claims	  connected	  to	  public	  debt.	  It	  was	  not	  earlier	  than	  in	  the	  1970-­‐es	  that	  the	  law	  changed,	  first	  in	  the	  US,	  then	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  other	  developed	  countries,	  allowing	  selective	  waiving	  of	  sovereign	  immunity	  (Buchheit	  198660,	  199561).	  	  The	  principle	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  also	  its	  procedural	  equivalent,	  known	  as	  the	  act	  of	  state.	  The	   act	   of	   state	   principle	   assumes	   that	   the	   courts	   of	   any	   given	   country	   have	   no	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  acts	  of	  other	  countries’	  governments.	  As	  a	  procedural	  rule,	  and	  at	  the	  difference	  of	  sovereign	  immunity,	  the	  act	  of	  state	  principle	  cannot	  be	  waived,	  but,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Brownlie, I., 2003. Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press 
60 Buchheit, L. C., 1986, Sovereign Immunity, Business Law Review (February), pp. 63–64 
61 Buchheit, L.C., 1995, The Sovereign Client, Journal of International Affairs 48 (Winter), pp. 527–540 
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the	  same	  time,	  does	  not	  influence	  the	  legal	  enforceability	  of	  claims	  (Power	  199662;	  Lee	  200363;	  Sturzenegger,	  Zettelmeyer	  200664).	  The	  real	  influence	  of	  creditors	  upon	  the	  political	  course	  of	  the	  indebted	  government,	  the	  principle	   of	   sovereign	   immunity	   taken	   into	   account,	   determines	   the	   limit	   of	   public	  indebtedness.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt	   lasts	  until	  an	   influential	  enough	  group	  of	  creditors	  forces	  the	  government	  to	  implement	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policy.	  Debt	   defaults,	   contrarily	   to	   the	   common	   opinion,	   do	   not	   necessarily	   put	   a	   brake	   to	  indebtedness.	   In	   that	   context,	   some	   change	   seems	   to	   emerge	   still	   it	   does	   not	   regard	  sovereign	   debt	   as	   such	   yet.	   It	   is	   about	   the	   investor-­‐state	   dispute	   settlement	   clause	  included	  in	  over	  2500	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  signed	  by	  more	  than	  174	  countries.	  That	  clause,	  allowing	  international	  arbitration	  in	  legal	  disputes	  between	  foreign	  private	  investors	   and	   their	   host	   governments,	   has	   been	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   quickly	   increasing	  number	  of	  cases,	  and	  verdicts	  (for	  more	  details,	  see	  for	  example:	  Franck	  200765).	  Whilst	  not	  concerning	  directly	  the	  issue	  of	  sovereign	  debt,	  those	  cases	  seem	  to	  be	  symptomatic	  for	  a	  new	  pattern	  of	  legal	  approach	  to	  sovereign	  immunity.	  	  Now,	  we	   add	   even	   stronger	   assumptions	   about	   the	   political	   system.	  We	   imagine	   two,	  
alternative	  political	   games.	  The	  first	  alternative	  is	  that	  the	  aggregate	  impact	  of	  fiscal	  decisions	   upon	   private	   property	   rights	   is	   proportional	   to	   the	   political	   power	   of	   the	  strongest	  political	  players.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  more	  concentrated	  is	  political	  power,	  the	  greater	  the	  impact	  of	  fiscal	  decisions	  upon	  private	  property	  rights.	  This	  is	  the	  world	  of	  mighty	  dictators.	  The	  second,	  alternative	  game	  makes	  the	  impact	  of	  fiscal	  decisions	  upon	  private	  property	  rights	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  political	  players	  with	  any	  political	  power,	  or	  veto	  players	  according	  to	  Tsebelis	  (Tsebelis	  2002).	  This	  game	  finds	  the	  best	  description	  in	  the	  French	  saying	  “the	  more	  of	  us	  join	  in,	  the	  more	  fun	  we	  all	  have”.	  	  The	  above	  distinction	  leads	  to	  formulating	  the	  last	  hypothesis,	  namely	  that	  the	   impact	  
of	   fiscal	   decision	   upon	   private	   property	   rights	   is	   significantly	   related	   to	   the	  
relative	  dispersion	  of	  political	  power	  within	  the	  political	  system.	  	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  presents	  empirical	  research,	  conducted	  by	  the	  author	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  the	  hypotheses	  stated	  in	  the	  theoretical	  model.	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Empirical	  research	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   the	   empirical	   study,	   as	   introduced	   in	   this	   chapter,	   was	   to	   grasp	  quantitatively	  the	  capital	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  the	  possible	  patterns	  of	  relation	   between	   said	   capital,	   and	   public	   debt.	   The	   available	   statistics	   (mostly	   those	  published	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund)	  provide	  two	  main	  variables:	  the	  total	  of	  public	   expenditures,	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   debt-­‐like	   financial	   assets	   held	   by	   the	  government.	  The	  latter	  variable	  can	  be	  computed	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  gross	  public	  debt,	  and	  net	  public	  debt.	  	  	  	  Three	  official	  databases	  have	  been	  used,	  to	  construe	  a	  data	  panel	  of	  1346	  observations	  in	  total,	  for	  77	  countries	  (see	  Table	  1	  in	  the	  Appendix):	  a) The	  core	  of	  the	  data	  was	  made	  of	  fiscal	  variables,	  as	  well	  as	  variables	  describing	  the	   processes	   of	   capital	   formation,	   sourced	   from	   the	  World	   Economic	   Outlook	  April	   2014	   database,	   published	   by	   the	   International	  Monetary	   Fund.	   The	   fiscal	  variables,	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  GDP,	  are:	  gross	  public	  debt,	  net	  public	  debt,	  general	  government	  expenditures,	  and	  general	  government	  revenue.	  As	  for	  capital	   formation,	   three	   variables	   have	   been	   used:	   private	   investment,	   gross	  national	  savings,	  and	  current	  account	  balance.	  All	  those	  variables	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  used	  the	  IMF	  database.	  b) Data	  available	  at	  http://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid-­‐effectiveness,	  as	  for	  some	  selected	  indicators	  of	  social	  development66.	  c) DPI2012	   -­‐	   Database	   of	   Political	   Institutions	   –	   as	   prepared	   by	   Philip	   Keefer,	  	  Development	  Research	  Group,	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Issued:	  December	  201267.	  	  The	  sample	  contains	  the	  biggest	  world	  debtors	  (US,	  UK,	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Japan),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  most	  indebted	  countries.	  The	  span	  of	  observation	  starts	  in	  1980	   and	   goes	   through	   2012	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   Syria68 	  and	   Greece69 ).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The variables taken into account in the present research are: a) mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) b) primary 
completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) c) proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) d) 
mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) e) improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) f) incidence of 
tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) g) vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) h) net migration i) life 
expectancy at birth, female (years) j) life expectancy at birth, male (years) 
67 The variables included into the present, compound database from the Database of Political Institutions were mostly the 
systemic ones, or those, which had been judged, more or less intuitively, as systemic, namely: system, and pluralty. As for 
the detailed definitions, see: Keefer, P, 2012, DPI2012, Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable 
Definitions, Development Research Group The World Bank, Issued: December 2012 
68 Observation ends in 2010, fault of further statistics available. 
69 Observation ends in 1999, faul of reliable statistics about net debt in subsequent years. By “reliable” the author means 
such statistics, in which the net debt differs in value from the gross debt; all governments hold as least some financial assets 
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periodization	  of	  the	  sample,	  i.e.	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  observed	  each	  consecutive	  year,	  progressively	   grows	   until	   2006	   (see	   Table	   2	   in	   the	   Appendix).	   Earlier	   years	   are	   less	  represented	   than	   the	   later	   ones;	   hence	  have	   less	   informational	   content,	  which	  will	   be	  subsequently	  explored	  as	  for	  the	  key	  variables.	  On	  the	  grounds	  of	  data	  available	  in	  the	  IMF	  database,	  two	  additional	  variables	  have	  been	  computed.	   Firstly,	   following	   the	   intuition	   of	   Franco	   Modigliani,	   the	   difference	   S	   –	   I,	  between	   gross	   national	   savings	   and	   private	   investment,	   as	   construed	   as	   another	  measure	  of	  capital	   formation.	  Using	  the	  S	  –	  I	  differential	   is	  criticisable.	   If	  we	  adopt	  the	  strictly	  Keynesian	  point	  of	  view,	  S	  –	  I	  does	  not	  exist,	  in	  fact.	  Then,	  even	  if	  one	  ignores	  the	  Keynesian	   identity	   S	   =	   I,	   it	   is	   easily	   demonstrable	   that	   the	   basic	   accounting	   identities	  that	  serve	  to	  compute	  the	  GDP,	  and	  the	  GNI,	  allow	  assuming	  that	  S	  –	  I	  =	  net	  exports.	  Yet,	  the	  preliminary	  tests	  showed	  that	  those	  allegedly	  obvious	  accounting	   identities	  do	  not	  necessarily	   hold	   as	   functional	   correlations	   in	   the	   sample	   studied.	   Secondly,	   the	  difference	   between	   gross	   public	   debt,	   and	   net	   public	   debt	   has	   been	   considered	   as	  measuring	   the	   scale	   of	   a	   separate	   fiscal	   phenomenon,	   namely	   the	   accumulation	   of	  financial	  assets	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  The	  first	  analytical	  step	  consisted	  in	  assessing	  both	  the	  long-­‐term	  trends	  as	  for	  fiscality,	  and	  capital	  formation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possible	  bias	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  those	  trends,	  due	  to	  uneven	  representation	  of	  particular	  years	   in	  the	  whole	  data	  panel.	  To	  that	  purpose,	  for	   each	   of	   those	  main	   variables	  median	   and	  mean	   value	   in	   the	   sample,	   as	  well	   as	   its	  cross-­‐sectional	  variance	  had	  been	  computed	  for	  each	  year	  separately.	  The	  time	  series	  of	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  mean	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  informative	  about	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  the	  given	  aggregate	  in	  time.	  The	  median	  may	  indicate	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  given	  pattern,	  whilst	   its	   comparison	   to	   the	   mean	   informs	   about	   the	   relative	   heteroscedacity	   of	   the	  cross-­‐sectional	  distribution,	  thus	  about	  the	  relative	  disparities	  in	  fiscal	  models.	  Variance	  goes	   in	   the	   same	  direction,	   informing	  how	  broad	   is	   the	   spread	  of	   tail	   cases	   in	   cross	   –	  sectional	  distributions.	  	  	  The	   time	   series	   of	   each	   of	   these	   statistics	   had	   been	   linearly,	   OLS	   regressed	   on	   the	  number	   of	   annual	   observations.	   If	   the	   corresponding	   regression	   rendered	   an	   R2	  coefficient	   of	   determination	   above	   0,1,	   the	   corrresponding	   regression	   function	   was	  subsequently	  used	   to	   smooth	   linearly	   the	   raw	   time	   series	  of	   the	  given	   statistic.	   In	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deducible from the gross debt, e.g. cash balances at the end of the year. In general, the sample does not contain some 
countries that are most interesting regarding their indebtedness, e.g. Argentina or India. Yet, for the same reason, namely 
lack of data about the net debt or net debt equal to the gross one, those countries have not been included in the empirical 
research.  
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opposite	  case	  (i.e.	  R2	  <	  0,1),	  no	  linear	  smoothing	  was	  done.	  In	  order	  to	  express	  all	  trends	  in	   a	   comparable	   manner,	   each	   time	   series,	   both	   raw	   and	   linearly	   smoothed,	   was	  transformed	   in	   a	   constant	   –	   base	   index,	  with	   the	   year	   2000	   as	   the	   base	   (i.e.	   equal	   to	  1,00).	  Graphs	  1	  –	  14,	  in	  the	  Appendix,	  show	  the	  results	  of	  that	  exploration	  for	  particular	  variables.	  That	  analytica	  step	  allows	  noticing	  a	  generally	  decreasing	  mean	  and	  variance	  of	  all	  the	  fiscal	  statistics,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  gross	  public	  debt.	  The	  latter	  displays	  a	  cyclically	   varying	   mean,	   and	   growing	   variance.	   It	   looks	   as	   if	   all	   the	   countries	   in	   the	  sample	   studied	   converged	   to	  more	  or	   less	   the	   same	  model	   of	   fiscality,	  with	   a	   steadily	  decreasing	   economic	   power	   of	   governments.	   Conversely,	   the	   pattern	   of	   gross	   public	  indebtedness	   seems	   to	   become	   more	   and	   more	   idiosyncratic,	   just	   as	   the	   pattern	   of	  aggregate	   savings.	   Thus,	  we	   have	   a	   sample,	   in	  which	   the	   accumulation	   of	   public	   debt	  becomes	  more	  and	  more	  idiosyncratic,	   just	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  private	  capital.	  Current	  fiscality	  of	   the	  countries	  studied,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  steadily	  converges	  to	  a	  narrowing	  band	  of	  possible	  states,	  and	  the	  central	  tendency	  of	  that	  band	  is	  rather	  decreasing.	  	  The	  next	  step	  of	  analysis	  consisted	  in	  testing	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  fiscal	  variables,	  and	  those	  reflecting	  private	  capital	  formation.	  In	  those,	  and	  consecutive	  tests,	  the	  same	  method	   had	   been	   used,	   namely	   linear,	   OLS	   regression,	   with	   robust	   standard	   errors	  accounting	  for	  the	  possible	  heteroscedacity.	  The	  compound	  database	  used	  in	  panel	  data	  analysis	   contains	   country-­‐level	   datasets	   displaying	   quite	   a	   disparate	   volume70.	   That	  disparity	  of	   observation	   spans	   is	   the	   reason	   for	  not	   accounting	   for	   fixed	  effects	   at	   the	  country	   level	   in	  the	  subsequent	  econometric	   test.	  As	  the	  database	  combines	  data	   from	  various	  years,	  very	  probably	  non-­‐stationary,	  it	  had	  been	  transformed	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  statistical	  analysis.	  The	  values	  of	  particular	  variables	   in	   the	   initial	  database	  have	  been	  standardized,	   by	   subtracting	   the	   mean	   of	   the	   given	   column	   and	   dividing	   it	   by	   its	  standard	  deviation	  to	  produce	  a	  column	  with	  the	  mean	  0	  and	  standard	  deviation	  equal	  to	   1.	   As	   public	   debt	   is	   in	   the	   very	   centre	   of	   the	   research,	   the	   important	   question	  was	  whether	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  gross	  debt,	  or	  on	  the	  net	  one.	   In	  the	  database	  used,	  these	  two	  variables	  are	  strongly	  intercorrelated,	  with	  the	  Pearson	  coefficient	  of	  correlation	  equal	  to	  r	  =	  0,872.	  It	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  put	  them	  as	  explanatory	  variables	  side	  by	  side	  in	  the	  same	  econometric	  test.	  Most	  classics	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  net	  debt	  (see	  for	  example:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For example, Vietnam and Costa Rica could be studied just over two consecutive years each. Table 4, in the Appendix, 
presents the number of observation years for each country. Observation ends in 2012, with the exception of Syria, where the 
end year is 2010.  
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Meade	   195871,	   Modigliani	   196172)	   when	   the	   central	   question	   is	   about	   the	   burden	   of	  debt.	  Yet,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  general	  question	  is	  slightly	  different,	  namely:	  why	  the	  capital	  transfers	   covered	  by	   the	   general,	   legal	   category	  of	  public	  borrowing	  are	   the	  way	   they	  are?	   Intuitively,	   the	   gross	   debt,	   reflecting	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   capital	   absorbed	   by	   the	  public	   sector	  via	   that	  category	  of	   contracts,	   seems	  more	   important.	  Still,	   each	   test	  had	  been	  conducted	  in	  two	  versions,	  alternating	  the	  gross,	  and	  the	  net	  debt	  as	  explanatory	  variable.	  The	  general	  rule	  was	  that	  if	  the	  results	  for	  the	  two	  versions	  were	  similar,	  the	  test	  with	   gross	  debt	  was	   chosen	   as	   the	  base	   for	   further	   theorizing.	   Should	   the	   results	  differ	  significantly,	  especially	  as	   for	   the	  sign	  of	   the	  coefficient	  of	   regression,	  both	   tests	  were	  included	  in	  further	  inference.	  	  	  Table	   3	   in	   the	   Appendix	   shows	   the	   results	   of	   regression	   tests	   between	   the	   fiscal	  variables	   as	   explanatory	   ones,	   and,	   respectively,	   aggregate	   savings,	   aggregate	  investment,	  and	  the	  aggregate	  S	  –	  I	  differential.	  Fiscal	  variables	  mean	  almost	  nothing	  for	  aggregate	   investment;	   their	   impact	   is	   mostly	   observable	   at	   the	   level	   of	   aggregate	  savings.	   The	   current	   account	   balance	   seems	   to	   have	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   private	   capital	  formation	  in	  the	  sample.	  Surprisingly	  enough,	  public	  expenditure,	  and	  gross	  public	  debt	  tend	  to	  impact	  negatively	  the	  gross	  savings,	  whilst	  public	  revenues,	  i.e.	  taxation,	  have	  a	  strong,	   positive	   influence.	   Those	   results	   seem	   counterintuitive,	   yet	   here	   they	   are.	   The	  more	  taxes	  levied,	  the	  more	  private	  savings	  accumulated.	  As	  for	  the	  S	  –	  I	  differential,	  the	  initial	  intuition	  was	  correct:	  the	  current	  account	  balance	  (which	  is	  a	  good	  approximation	  of	  net	  exports),	  explains	   just	  a	   fraction	  of	   it.	  The	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt	  seems	  to	  build	  up	  that	  S	  –	  I	  surplus;	  yet,	  once	  more	  taxation	  has	  that	  surprising,	  positive	  effect.	  	  In	  order	  to	  contrast	  the	  impact	  of	  fiscal	  decisions	  upon	  private	  property	  rights	  with	  that	  upon	  social	  outcomes,	  another	  series	  of	  tests	  was	  conducted.	  Table	  4,	   in	  the	  Appendix,	  shows	   the	   results	   of	   regressing	   linearly	   selected	   social	   variables	   on	   fiscal	   variables.	  Gross	  public	  debt	  has	  an	  undoubtfully	  noxious	  influence:	  the	  more	  indebted	  the	  public	  sector,	   the	  poorer	  social	  outcomes.	  Thus,	   the	  whole	  thesis	  of	  public	  borrowing	  serving	  the	  public	  mission	  of	  governments	  seems	  to	  be	  false,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sample	  studied.	  	  	  	  The	  next	  analytical	  step	  was	  to	  compare	  different	  political	  systems,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  general	  methodological	  path	  signalled	  earlier	  as	  present	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  political	  sciences.	   As	   the	   distinction	   goes	   along	   the	   relative	   concentration	   or	   dispersion	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Meade, J.E., 1958, Is The National Debt a Burden, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 10, Issue 2 (June, 1958), pp. 163 - 183 
72 Modigliani, F., 1961, Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies And The Burden of The National Debt, Economic 
Journal, vol. 71 (December 1961), pp. 730–755 
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political	   power,	   two	   discriminatory	   variables	   had	   been	   chosen	   from	   the	   Database	   of	  Political	   Institutions:	   system,	   and	   plurality/proportional.	   The	   “System”	   variable	  distinguishes	   three	   modalities,	   namely:	   parliamentary,	   assembly	   –	   elected	   president,	  and	  presidential.	  Note	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Database	  of	  Political	  Institutions	  use	  quite	  a	  broad	  definition	  of	  presidential	  systems,	  somehow	  exceeding	  the	  usual	  classification.	  In	  other	  words,	  some	  cases,	  which	  usually	  would	  be	  categorized	  as	  parliamentary,	  are	  categorized	  here	  as	  presidential.	  Anyway,	  typical	  presidential	  systems	  are	  considered	  as	  those	   with	   rather	   concentrated	   political	   power,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   more	   diffuse	  distribution	  of	  power	  in	  parliamentary	  ones.	  	  The	   “plurality/proportional”	   variable	   refers	   to	   electoral	   rules	   in	   legislative	   elections.	  Plurality	  means	  that	  legislators	  are	  elected	  using	  a	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  /	  first	  past	  the	  post	  rule.	  Conversely,	  proportional	  representation	  means	  that	  candidates	  are	  elected	  on	  the	  grounds	   of	   the	   percent	   of	   votes	   received	   by	   their	   party.	   The	   former	   is	   commonly	  associated	  with	  a	  relative	  concentration	  of	  political	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  strongest	  political	   parties,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   allows	   greater	   dispersion	   of	   power	   within	   the	  legislative.	  	  Tables	   5	   –	   8	   in	   the	   Appendix	   show	   the	   basic	   statistics	   as	   for	   fiscal	   variables	   in	   the	  sample,	   broken	   into	   categories	   according	   to	   those	   two	   systemic	   attributes	   of	   political	  systems.	  Both	  seem	  relevant.	  Parliamentary	  systems	  tend	  to	  spend	  more,	  borrow	  more,	  and	   tax	   heavier	   than	   the	   presidential	   ones.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   proportional	  representation	   in	   the	   legislative	   body	   seems	   to	   add	   to	   that	   fiscal	   expansiveness	   of	  parliamentary	  systems.	  Parliamentary	  systems	  with	  proportional	  representation73	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  opposite	  of	  presidential	  systems	  with	  plurality	  in	  legislative	  elections74,	  as	  for	  the	   concentration	  of	  political	  power,	   and	   the	   corresponding	   impact	  of	   fiscality.	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	   two	   outcomes	   seem	   the	   most	   meaningful	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   previously	  conducted	  tests:	  the	  S	  –	  I	  surplus	  as	  for	  capital	  formation,	  and	  vulnerable	  employment	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  social	  variables.	  Tables	  9	  and	  10	  in	  the	  Appendix	  list	  the	  results	  of	  those	  tests.	  Fiscal	  variables	   shape	  vulnerable	  employment	   in	  quite	  a	   similar	  manner	   in	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Austria 1988 – 2012, Belgium 1980 – 2012, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 – 2012, Bulgaria 2002 – 2012, Denmark 1995 – 2012, 
FYR Macedonia 2003 – 2012, Finland 1980 – 2012, Iceland 1982 – 2012, Ireland 1980 – 2012, Israel 2002 – 2012, Italy 1988 – 
1993, Latvia 2000 – 2006, Netherlands 1995 – 2012, Norway 1980 – 2012, Portugal 1997 – 2012, Sweden 1993 – 2012, Turkey 
2002 - 2004 
74 Bahrain 2003 – 2012, Bolivia 2000 – 2012, Brazil 2000 – 2012, Chile 1993 – 2012, Egypt 2006 – 2012, Ghana 2001 – 2012, Iran 
1996 – 2012, Jordan 1990 – 2009, Kazachstan 2002 – 2007, Kenya 1998 – 2012, Korea 2001 – 2012, Liberia 2006 – 2012, 
Lithuania 2000 – 2012, Malawi 2005 – 2012, Maldives 1997 – 2012, Mali 2000 – 2012, Mexico 1998 – 2012, Morocco 1996 – 2012, 
Niger 1995 – 1996, 2005 – 2006, Nigeria 2000 – 2012, Pakistan 2003 – 2008, Panama 2003 – 2011, Poland 2007 – 2012, 
Swaziland 2007 – 2012, Syria 1990 – 2010, Ukraine 1998 – 2006, United States 2001 – 2012, Yemen 2000 – 2012, Zambia 2005 – 
2012 
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types	  of	  political	  systems.	  The	  implied	  constant	  term,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government’s	  financial	   assets	   differ,	   though.	   In	   presidential	   systems	   with	   plurality	   in	   legislative	  elections,	   the	   level	  of	  vulnerable	  employment	   seems	   to	  be	  much	  more	   resilient	   to	  any	  fiscal	   decisions,	   and	   the	   accumulation	   of	   financial	   assets	   significantly,	   and	   adversely	  impacts	   the	   labour	   market.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   way	   that	   fiscality	   shapes	   the	  accumulation	  of	  private	  property	  rights,	  as	  measured	  woth	  the	  S	  –	   I	  surplus,	   is	  clearly	  distinct,	   according	   to	   the	   type	   of	   political	   system.	   Parliamentary	   systems	   with	  proportional	   representation	   are	   associated	   with	   a	   strong,	   positive	   impact	   of	   public	  borrowing	   upon	   the	   S	   –	   I	   surplus.	   Those	   cases	   seem	   to	   work	   accordingly	   to	   the	  hypotheses	  of	   the	  model.	   Conversely,	   presidential	   systems	  with	  plurality	   in	   legislative	  elections	   seem	   to	  work	   almost	   perfectly	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   “S	   –	   I	   =	   net	   exports”	  accounting	  identity.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Different	   political	   systems	   generate	   different	   interaction	   between	   fiscality,	   capital	  formation,	  and	  social	  outcomes.	  Thus,	  different	  political	  systems	  generate	  different	  link	  between	  strategies	  oriented	  on	  political	  power,	  those	  oriented	  on	  social	  outcomes,	  and	  those	  oriented	  on	  private	  property	  rights.	  	  	  Public	   borrowing	   is	   essentially	   a	   transfer	   of	   capital.	   That	   capital	   keeps	   on	   being	  transferred	   to	   the	   richest	   countries	   in	   the	  world.	  The	   transfer	   is	   largely	  driven	  by	   the	  internal,	  political	  mechanics	  of	  these	  countries.	  Thus,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt	  in	  those	  richest	  countries	   is	  an	  almost	  self-­‐sustainable	  mechanism,	   limited	  mostly	  by	   the	  tolerance	   of	   capital	   markets.	   That	   tolerance	   is	   probably	   based	   on	   a	   complex	   set	   of	  criteria.	  There	   is	  the	  potentially	  non-­‐optimal	  allocation	  of	  publicly	  borrowed	  money	  in	  non-­‐productive	   assets	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	   There	   is	   the	   political	   power	   provided	   by	  borrowed	  capital.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  a	  flow	  of	  capital,	  in	  which	  strong	  political	  drivers	  push	  to	  non-­‐optimal	  allocation	  of	  capital	  at	   the	  global	  scale.	   If	  we	  assume	  the	  dominance	  of	  political	   factors	   in	   this	   mechanism,	   logically	   only	   a	   substantial	   change	   in	   these	   could	  bring	  a	  substantial	  change	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  geography	  of	  public	  borrowing.	  A	  substantial	  political	  change	  would	  probably	  mean	  less	  veto	  players,	  more	  policy	  change,	  and	  more	  government	  stability.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  would	  mean	  a	  possible	  limitation	  of	  democracy.	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The	   income	   side	   of	   the	   fiscal	   equation	   encompasses	   flows,	   which	   are	   essentially	   the	  circulating	  capital	  of	   the	  whole	  economy.	  Taxes	  do	  diminish	   the	   individual,	  disposable	  income,	  but	  they	  create	  a	  flow	  that	  serves	  to	  earn	  more	  income.	  Public	  expenditures,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   seem	   to	   push	   private	   capital	   out	   of	   circulation.	   Probably	   there	   is	  substitution	   between	   savings	   and	   public	   goods	   created	   by	   public	   expenditures,	   and	   a	  complementarity	   between	   consumption	   and	   those	   public	   goods.	   In	   terms	   of	   Franco	  Modigliani’s	  lifecycle	  hypothesis	  of	  savings,	  taxation	  seems	  to	  create	  more	  incentives	  for	  saving,	  whilst	  public	  goods	  bring	  fewer	  incentives.	  	  The	  value	  added	  of	  the	  empirical	  research	  presented	  in	  the	  present	  paper	  is	  to	  carry	  out	  further	   the	   distinction	   between	   various	   political	   systems	   as	   for	   their	   fiscality.	   In	  presidential	  ones,	  or	  the	  ones	  with	  plurality,	  the	  fiscality	  works	  exactly	  opposite	  to	  those	  with	   parliamentary	   systems,	   and	   with	   proportionality	   in	   elections.	   Parliamentary	  systems	   use	   public	   debt	   to	   increase	   private	   S	   –	   I,	   and	   private	   savings,	   whilst	   the	  influence	  of	   fiscality	  upon	  social	  outcomes	   is	  problematic.	   In	  presidential	  systems,	   it	   is	  the	  opposite.	  Fiscal	  impact	  upon	  capital	  formation	  is	  at	  the	  limit	  of	  any	  certainty,	  whilst	  the	  fiscal	  impact	  upon	  social	  outcomes	  is	  strong	  and	  generally	  positive.	  In	  democracies	  with	   plurality	   in	   elections,	   the	   fiscal	   impact	   upon	   capital	   formation	   is	   at	   the	   limit	   of	  significance,	  whilst	  in	  proportional	  democracies	  there	  is	  that	  strong	  influence	  of	  public	  revenues	  upon	  S	  –	  I,	  savings,	  and	  opposite	  on	  private	  investment.	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Appendix	  	  	  
Table	  1	  Sample	  structure	  
Country	   count	   Share	  in	  the	  
sample	  
Country	   count	   Share	  in	  the	  
sample	  Algeria	   12	   0,9%	   Lebanon	   13	   1,0%	  Australia	   24	   1,8%	   Lesotho	   8	   0,6%	  Austria	   25	   1,9%	   Liberia	   13	   1,0%	  Bahrain	   23	   1,7%	   Libya	   23	   1,7%	  Belgium	   33	   2,5%	   Lithuania	   13	   1,0%	  Belize	   11	   0,8%	   Malawi	   8	   0,6%	  Bolivia	   13	   1,0%	   Maldives	   16	   1,2%	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	   15	   1,1%	   Mali	   13	   1,0%	  Brazil	   13	   1,0%	   Mexico	   15	   1,1%	  Bulgaria	   13	   1,0%	   Morocco	   17	   1,3%	  Canada	   33	   2,5%	   Namibia	   7	   0,5%	  Cape	  Verde	   11	   0,8%	   Netherlands	   18	   1,3%	  Chile	   20	   1,5%	   New	  Zealand	   28	   2,1%	  Colombia	   14	   1,0%	   Niger	   18	   1,3%	  Denmark	   18	   1,3%	   Nigeria	   13	   1,0%	  Egypt	   11	   0,8%	   Norway	   33	   2,5%	  Estonia	   17	   1,3%	   Pakistan	   11	   0,8%	  Ethiopia	   21	   1,6%	   Panama	   10	   0,7%	  FYR	  Macedonia	   14	   1,0%	   Peru	   13	   1,0%	  Fiji	   21	   1,6%	   Poland	   18	   1,3%	  Finland	   33	   2,5%	   Portugal	   16	   1,2%	  France	   30	   2,2%	   Quatar	   23	   1,7%	  Germany	   22	   1,6%	   Saudi	  Arabia	   14	   1,0%	  Ghana	   12	   0,9%	   Solomon	  Islands	   10	   0,7%	  Greece	   20	   1,5%	   South	  Africa	   13	   1,0%	  Guyana	   6	   0,4%	   Spain	   28	   2,1%	  Hungary	   8	   0,6%	   Swaziland	   12	   0,9%	  Iceland	   31	   2,3%	   Sweden	   20	   1,5%	  Ireland	   33	   2,5%	   Switzerland	   30	   2,2%	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	   17	   1,3%	   Syria	   21	   1,6%	  Israel	   13	   1,0%	   Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	   13	   1,0%	  Italy	   25	   1,9%	   Turkey	   11	   0,8%	  Japan	   33	   2,5%	   Ukraine	   15	   1,1%	  Jordan	   25	   1,9%	   United	  Arab	  Emirates	   14	   1,0%	  Kazakhstan	   11	   0,8%	   United	  Kingdom	   33	   2,5%	  Kenya	   15	   1,1%	   United	  States	   12	   0,9%	  Korea	   12	   0,9%	   Uruguay	   10	   0,7%	  Latvia	   13	   1,0%	   Yemen	   14	   1,0%	  	   	   	   Zambia	   8	   0,6%	  	   	   	   Total	   721	   	  
Source:	  author’s	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Table	  2	  Sample	  periodization	  
Year	   count	   Share	   Year	   count	   Share	  1980	   8	   0,6%	   1996	   33	   2,5%	  1981	   8	   0,6%	   1997	   35	   2,6%	  1982	   9	   0,7%	   1998	   39	   2,9%	  1983	   11	   0,8%	   1999	   44	   3,3%	  1984	   11	   0,8%	   2000	   57	   4,2%	  1985	   13	   1,0%	   2001	   62	   4,6%	  1986	   13	   1,0%	   2002	   68	   5,1%	  1987	   13	   1,0%	   2003	   70	   5,2%	  1988	   16	   1,2%	   2004	   70	   5,2%	  1989	   17	   1,3%	   2005	   73	   5,4%	  1990	   21	   1,6%	   2006	   74	   5,5%	  1991	   22	   1,6%	   2007	   75	   5,6%	  1992	   24	   1,8%	   2008	   76	   5,6%	  1993	   26	   1,9%	   2009	   76	   5,6%	  1994	   26	   1,9%	   2010	   76	   5,6%	  1995	   30	   2,2%	   2011	   75	   5,6%	  	   	   	   2012	   75	   5,6%	  	   	   	   Total	   1346	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  1	  Trends	  in	  the	  gross	  public	  debt	  in	  the	  sample,	  median	  and	  mean	  value	  year	  by	  year	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  2	  Trends	  in	  the	  gross	  public	  debt	  in	  the	  sample,	  comparison	  of	  the	  raw	  (non-­‐smoothed)	  with	  the	  
linearly	  smoothed,	  cross-­‐sectional	  variance.	  Index	  values,	  with	  2000	  =	  1,00	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  3	  Mean	  and	  median	  value	  of	  financial	  assets	  in	  public	  dispotition	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  4	  Smoothed	  mean	  and	  smoothed	  median	  value	  of	  financial	  assets	  in	  public	  dispotition	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  5	  Cross-­‐sectional	  variance	  of	  financial	  assets	  in	  public	  disposition,	  raw	  and	  linearly	  smoothed	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  6	  Mean	  and	  median	  share	  of	  gross	  public	  expenditures	  in	  the	  GDP,	  in	  the	  sample	  studied	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  7	  Smoothed	  mean	  and	  smoothed	  median	  share	  of	  gross	  public	  expenditures	  in	  the	  GDP,	  in	  the	  sample	  
studied	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  	  
Graph	  8	  Cross-­‐sectional	  variance	  of	  gross	  public	  expenditures	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  9	  Median	  and	  mean	  of	  gross	  public	  revenues,	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  10	  Smoothed	  median	  and	  smoothed	  mean	  of	  gross	  public	  expenditures	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  11	  Cross-­‐sectional	  variance	  of	  gross	  public	  revenues,	  raw	  and	  linearly	  smoothed,	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  12	  Median	  and	  mean	  of	  gross	  national	  savings,	  as	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Graph	  13	  Median	  and	  smoothed	  mean	  of	  gross	  national	  savings,	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	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Graph	  14	  Cross-­‐sectional	  variance	  of	  gross	  national	  savings	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  raw	  and	  linearly	  smoothed.	  
	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Table	  3	  Results	  of	  OLS	  linear	  regression	  between	  fiscal	  variables	  and	  private	  capital	  formation,	  the	  whole	  
sample	  
Explained	  variable:	  Gross	  national	  savings	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1268,	  R2	  =	  0,603	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,158	   0,035	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,006	   0,019	   p	  =	  0,730	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,566	   0,031	   p < 0,001	  std(Current	  account	  balance)	   0,788	   0,029	   p < 0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,624	   0,031	   p < 0,001	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,011	   0,018	   p	  =	  0,528	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Private	  investment	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1268,	  R2	  =	  0,076	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,395	   0,053	   p < 0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   0,066	   0,029	   p	  =	  0,023	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,045	   0,039	   p	  =	  0,257	  std(Current	  account	  balance)	   -­‐0,121	   0,04	   p	  =	  0,003	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,066	   0,042	   p	  =	  0,117	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,019	   0,027	   p	  =	  0,467	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  The	  S	  –	  I	  surplus	  (savings	  minus	  investment)	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1268,	  R2	  =	  0,823	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,087	   0,023	   p < 0,001 std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,05	   0,011	   p < 0,001	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,605	   0,028	   p < 0,001	  std(Current	  account	  balance)	   0,977	   0,023	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,756	   0,03	   p	  <	  0,001	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,004	   0,011	   p	  =	  0,747	  	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	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Table	  4	  Results	  of	  OLS	  linear	  regression	  between	  fiscal	  variables	  and	  social	  outcomes,	  total	  sample	  
Explained	  variable:	  Primary	  completion	  rate,	  total	  (%	  of	  relevant	  age	  group)	  ,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  828,	  R2	  =	  0,130	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,145	   0,055	   p	  =	  0,009	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,129	   0,041	   p	  =	  0,002	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   0,198	   0,047	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,215	   0,045	   p	  <	  0,001	  Constant	  term	   0,031	   0,031	   p	  =	  0,312	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Proportion	  of	  seats	  held	  by	  women	  in	  national	  parliaments	  (%),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1008,	  R2	  =	  0,247	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,118	   0,033	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   0,217	   0,033	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   0,456	   0,04	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,044	   0,044	   p	  =	  0,318	  Constant	  term	   0,067	   0,028	   p	  =	  0,018	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Mortality	  rate,	  under-­‐5	  (per	  1,000	  live	  births),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1268,	  R2	  =	  0,288	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,145	   0,02	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   0,104	   0,04	   p	  =	  0,009	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,464	   0,031	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,09	   0,03	   p	  =	  0,003	  Constant	  term	   0,009	   0,024	   p	  =	  0,712	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Improved	  sanitation	  facilities	  (%	  of	  population	  with	  access),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1151	  ,	  R2	  =	  0,309	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,116	   0,017	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,023	   0,032	   p	  =	  0,461	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   0,457	   0,03	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,067	   0,03	   p	  =	  0,027	  Constant	  term	   0,033	   0,025	   p	  =	  0,184	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Incidence	  of	  tuberculosis	  (per	  100,000	  people),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  1214	  ,	  R2	  =	  0,072	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,024	   0,022	   p	  =	  0,278	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,022	   0,019	   p	  =	  0,237	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,251	   0,026	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,021	   0,022	   p	  =	  0,341	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,012	   0,027	   p	  =	  0,656	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Vulnerable	  employment,	  total	  (%	  of	  total	  employment),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  776,	  R2	  =	  0,391	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,391	   0,059	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,105	   0,029	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,598	   0,039	   p	  <	  0,001	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std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,074	   0,029	   p	  =	  0,012	  Constant	  term	   0,149	   0,034	   p	  <	  0,001	  	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  	  
Table	  5	  Gross	  public	  debt	  across	  political	  systems	  
Plurality/proport
ional	  
representation	   in	  
elections	  
System	   Count	   median(Gross	  
public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
var(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
mean(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
Proportional	  representation	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   38	   30,968	   567,2186667	   28,60718421	  Parliamentary	   326	   51,822	   847,7769834	   57,18532515	  Presidential	   102	   38,541	   20048,63843	   69,55312745	  Missing	   5	   35,23	   141,5773325	   42,31	  Plurality	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   29	   102,093	   2985,685614	   105,0233448	  Parliamentary	   384	   57,252	   1271,18236	   63,0951901	  Presidential	   342	   44,986	   3081,965061	   56,27138304	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  Missing	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   2	   791,624	   4250,512201	   745,5235	  Parliamentary	   6	   54,544	   4,343964567	   53,78183333	  Presidential	   112	   29,463	   1782,528823	   42,95429464	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  	  	  
Table	  6	  Gross	  public	  revenues	  across	  political	  systems	  
Plurality/proportio
nal	   representation	  
in	  elections	  
System	   Count	   median(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
var(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
mean(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  Proportional	  representation	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   38	   34,723	   30,59416851	   32,37436842	  
Parliamentary	   326	   44,705	   306,21749	   40,44866258	  Presidential	   102	   28,562	   78,09491541	   29,74111765	  Missing	   5	   51,669	   18,9625678	   50,2596	  Plurality	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   29	   24,166	   21,9611591	   22,96889655	  
Parliamentary	   384	   36,886	   76,42636257	   37,45710417	  Presidential	   342	   25,514	   47,6951815	   27,01095614	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  Missing	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   2	   11,971	   0,09245	   11,756	  Parliamentary	   6	   26,101	   1,310126	   26,39	  Presidential	   112	   33,798	   168,1437483	   34,10954464	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	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Table	  7	  Gross	  public	  expenditures	  accross	  political	  systems	  
Plurality/proportio
nal	   representation	  
in	  elections	  
System	   Count	   median(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
var(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
mean(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  Proportional	  representation	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   38	   33,144	   29,11514865	   33,75068421	  Parliamentary	   326	   48,267	   59,16299768	   47,54094479	  Presidential	   102	   31,168	   95,98640353	   31,11404902	  Missing	   5	   56,631	   30,2214252	   55,0542	  Plurality	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   29	   33,245	   34,21738883	   32,17355172	  Parliamentary	   384	   39,306	   77,70103166	   39,92342969	  Presidential	   342	   28,474	   53,96524678	   29,30023977	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  Missing	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   2	   12,001	   0,106722	   11,77	  Parliamentary	   6	   27,818	   2,041742667	   27,28333333	  Presidential	   112	   30,5	   84,40674999	   30,99758036	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Table	  8	  Public	  financial	  assets	  across	  political	  systems	  
Plurality/proportio
nal	   representation	  
in	  elections	  
System	   Count	   median(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
var(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  
mean(Gross	  public	  
debt,	  %	  GDP)	  Proportional	  representation	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   38	   5,977	   123,6170295	   8,695	  Parliamentary	   326	   19,865	   2442,475077	   39,49945399	  Presidential	   102	   10,275	   339,9008779	   18,00990196	  Missing	   5	   3,66	   1,0186228	   3,5806	  Plurality	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   29	   3,817	   80,39392549	   8,176724138	  Parliamentary	   384	   11,484	   509,6066586	   19,6848099	  Presidential	   342	   6,692	   165,8327955	   10,94528363	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  Missing	   Assembly-­‐Elected	  President	   2	   66,586	   149,921928	   57,928	  Parliamentary	   6	   4,026	   0,761369467	   3,900333333	  Presidential	   112	   16,709	   2105,688853	   40,59149107	  Missing	   0	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Table	  9	  Regression	  results	  in	  the	  subsample	  of	  “Presidential	  with	  plurality	  in	  legislative	  elections”	  
Explained	  variable:	  The	  S	  –	  I	  surplus	  (savings	  minus	  investment)	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  335	  ,	  R2	  =	  0,967	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   -­‐0,005	   0,01	   p	  =	  0,639	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,005	   0,011	   p	  =	  0,646	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,014	   0,011	   p	  =	  0,185	  std(Current	  account	  balance)	   1,306	   0,014	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,014	   0,016	   p	  =	  0,377	  Constant	  term	   0,083	   0,01	   p	  <	  0,001	  
	   41	  
	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Vulnerable	  employment,	  total	  (%	  of	  total	  employment),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  150	  ,	  R2	  =	  0,222	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,397	   0,144	   p	  =	  0,007	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   0,762	   0,386	   p	  =	  0,051	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,858	   0,39	   p	  =	  0,029	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   -­‐0,027	   0,621	   p	  =	  0,966	  Constant	  term	   0,601	   0,151	   p	  <	  0,001	  	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  
Table	  10	  Regression	  results	  in	  the	  subsample	  of	  “Parliamentary	  system	  with	  proportional	  representation	  in	  
the	  legislative”	  
Explained	  variable:	  The	  S	  –	  I	  surplus	  (savings	  minus	  investment)	  as	  %	  of	  the	  GDP,	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  316	  ,	  R2	  =	  0,839	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,299	   0,062	   p	  <	  0,001 std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,051	   0,014	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,553	   0,044	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Current	  account	  balance)	   0,909	   0,039	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,842	   0,037	   p	  <	  0,001	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,182	   0,035	   p	  <	  0,001	  	   	   	   	  
Explained	  variable:	  Vulnerable	  employment,	  total	  (%	  of	  total	  employment),	  standardized	  values,	  N	  =	  262,	  R2	  =	  0,317	  
Explanatory	  variable	   Coefficient	  of	  regression	   Standard	  error	   Significance	  level,	  as	  given	  
by	  the	  T	  Student	  test	  std(Gross	  public	  debt,	  %	  GDP)	   0,338	   0,078	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Financial	  assets	  %	  of	  GDP	  (gross	  minus	  net	  debt))	   -­‐0,115	   0,015	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(Gross	   public	  expenditures,	  %	  of	  GDP)	   -­‐0,302	   0,051	   p	  <	  0,001	  std(General	   government	  revenue)	   0,009	   0,018	   p	  =	  0,621	  Constant	  term	   -­‐	  0,113	   0,059	   p	  =	  0,056	  	   	   	   	  
Source:	  author’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
